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I. INTRODUCTION
It has been almost a century since the juvenile court "experiment"
began in the United States.' The practice of processing juveniles'
cases in a judicial system designed to specifically deal with juveniles
instead of having juveniles be subject to the procedures and penalties
of the adult criminal justice system has been but one step (albeit a
major one) on a long ladder of legal reforms that have been imple-
mented in hopes of effectively and humanely dealing with juveniles
who commit crimes. Reforms had been taking place in juvenile penol-
ogy for nearly a century prior to the juvenile court experiment. 2 The
notion of a separate juvenile justice system 3 was a logical development
1. See generally E. RYERSON, THE BEST LAID PLANS: AMERCA'S JUVENILE COURT
EXPERIMENT (1978). Chicago is most frequently identified as the location of the
first juvenile court. See infra text at notes 6-9. However, there also is evidence to
support Denver's Claim that Judge Benjamin Lindsey began the first juvenile
justice court. See G. VEDDER, JUVENILE OFFENDERS 145 (1963). See also A. PLATr,
THE CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF DELiNQUENCY 9-10 (2d ed. 1977); S.
SCHLOSSMAN, LOVE AND THE AMERICAN DELINQUENT. THE THEORY AND PRAC.
TICE OF "PROGRESSIVE" JUVENILE JUSTICE 1825-1920 133 (1977).
2. See L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 259-61 (1973); W. LEWIS, FROM
NEWGATE TO DANNEMORA: THE RISE OF THE PENITENTIARY IN NEW YORK 1796-
1848 (1965); R. PICKETT, HOUSE OF REFUGE ORIGINS OF JUVENILE REFORM IN
NEW YORK STATE 1858-1857 (1969); A. PLATT, supra note 1, at 46-74; D. ROTHMAN,
THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM: SOCIAL ORDER AND DISORDER IN THE NEW RE-
PuBLIc (1971). The first U.S. institution designated solely for the care of juvenile
offenders was opened on New Year's Day, 1825, in New York City by the Society
for the Reformation of Juvenile Delinquents. R. MENNEL, THORNS AND THIS-
TLES: JUVENILE DELINQUENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 1825-1940 (1973). Similar
institutions opened shortly thereafter in Massachusetts and Pennsylvania. Spe-
cial juvenile correctional institutions continued to be opened throughout the
country during the 19th century.
3. See generally J. HAWEs, CHILDREN IN URBAN SocmTy: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1971); R. MENNEL, suprm note 2; R. PiCxET,
supra note 2; D. ROTHMAN, supra note 2; E. RYERSON, supra note 1; S. SCHLoSS-
MAN, supra note 1; Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22
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following earlier innovations such as appointing a child advocate to
investigate whether punishment would be in a child's best interest.4 It
also was a major structural and procedural change instituted to rem-
edy the haphazard handling of juvenile offenders5 in places like Illi-
nois, where the courts had severely curtailed the power of the State's
legal and social welfare/charity organizations to intervene in the lives
of juveniles.6
Illinois led the way in state reform. In 1899 the Illinois legislature
enacted the Juvenile Court Act,7 partly in response to the restrictions
imposed by the courts and partly as an inevitable next step in the
march of reforms targeting juveniles.8 The Juvenile Court Act repre-
sented the first attempt to organize reforms such as juvenile courts,
probation, child guidance clinics, and reformatories into a "coherent
system of juvenile justice."9
Not surprisingly, given the receptivity of the times for trying new
ways to deal with "wayward youths," most states followed the lead set
by Illinois. In 1908, Utah became the first state to create a state-con-
trolled juvenile court system. By 1917, virtually all states had passed a
juvenile court act. The last state to establish a separate juvenile court
was Wyoming, which finally did so in 1945.10
STAN. L. REV. 1187 (1970); Rendleman, Parens Patriae: From Chancery to the
Juvenile Court, 23 S.C.L. REV. 205 (1971).
4. Sullinger reported that such a procedure was introduced in Massachusetts in
1869. T. SULLINGER, SocIAL DETERmiANTs IN JUVENILE DELINQUENCY 225
(1936).
5. R. MENNEL, supra note 2, at 128.
6. County of Cook v. The Chicago Industrial School for Girls, 125 Ill. 540,18 N.E. 183
(1888); Angelo v. People, 96 IM. 209 (1880); People ex rel. O'Connell v. Turner, 55
Ill. 280, 8 Am. Rep. 645 (1870). See generally R. MENNEL, supra note 2, at 125-28;
Fox, supra note 3, at 1212-28.
7. Illinois Juvenile Court Act, 1899 ILL. LAws 131. et seq., reprinted in CHLDaREN
AND YOUTH IN AMERIcA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 507-11 (R. Bremner, J. Bar-
nard, T. Hereven & R. Mennel eds. 2d ed. 1971). The current Illinois Juvenile
Court Act of 1987 may be found at ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, para. 801-1 to 807-1
(Smith-Hurd 1990)
8. Some jurisdictions, such as Massachusetts, New York, and Rhode Island, had al-
ready been holding separate hearings for juveniles charged with crimes since the
early to mid-1800s. T. SULLENGER, supra note 4, at 225. However these efforts did
not go so far as creating a separate system to address youth crime and criminals.
9. A. PLA2r, supra note 1, at xviii (emphasis in original). See also id. at 9-10.
10. See Handier, The Juvenile Court and the Adversary System.. Problems of Func-
tion and Form, 1965 Wis. L. REv. 7. For detailed histories of the juvenile court
and the juvenile justice movement, see JUVENILE JUSTICE PHILOSOPHY: READ-
INGS, CASES AND CoMmENTs (F. Faust & P. Brantingham eds. 2d ed. 1979); J.
HAWES, supra note 3; R. MENNEL, supra note 2; A. PLATr, supra note 1; E. RYER-
SON, supra note 1; S. SCHLOSSMAN, supra note 1; Fox, supra note 3; Rendleman,
supra note 3. See also THE CHILDREN ISHMAEL: CsrICAL PERSPECTIVES ON JUVE-
NILE JUSTICE (B. Krisberg & J. Austin eds. 1978); T. HURLEY, THE ORIGIN OF THE
JUVENILE COURT LAw (1907); JUVENILE JUSTICE: THE PROGRESSIVE LEGACY AND
CURRENT REFORMS (L. Empey ed. 1979); C. LARSEN, THE GOOD FIGHT (1972); M.
[Vol. 69:298
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Today, juvenile courts are commonplace. The issue now facing
states isi not whether to begin a separate juvenile justice system, but
whether to dismantle the separate juvenile justice system currently in
place." Numerous commentators and researchers have charged that
one of the problems with the juvenile justice system is that there is a
misplaced focus on offender characteristics, such as a juvenile's race
and socioeconomic status, that should not contribute to juvenile court
decisions.12 They claim that the use of "extra-legal" offender factors
LEVINE & A. LEVINE, A SOCIAL HISTORY OF HELPING SERVICES: CLINIC, COURT,
SCHOOL, AND CoMMuNITY (1970); B. LINDSEY & R. BOROUGH, THE DANGEROUS
LIFE (1931); H. Lou, JUVENILE COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES (1927); R. PicKctt,
supm note 2; D. RoTHmAI, supra note 2; B. ROWLES, THE LADY AT Box 99 (1962);
G. VEDDER, supra note 1; Beemsterboer, The Juvenile Court - Benevolence in
the Star Chamber, 50 J. Clim. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SC. 464 (1960); Cald-
well, The Juvenile Court. Its Development and Some Major Problems, 51 J. CRns.
L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 493 (1961); Chute, The Juvenile Court in Retro-
spect, 23 FED. PROBATION 3 (Sept. 1949); Lemert, Juvenile Justice - Quest and
Reality, TRANS-ACTION 30 (July 1967); Paulsen, Kent v. United States: The Con-
stitutional Context of Juvenile Cases, 1966 SUP. CT. REV. 167; Schultz, The Cycle
of Juvenile Court History, 19 CRIME & DELINQ. 457 (1973).
11. E.g., K. Federle, The Abolition of the Juvenile Court: A Proposal for the Preser-
vation of Children's Legal Rights (paper presented at the meeting of the Ameri-
can Society of Criminology, Chicago, Illinois, Nov. 11, 1988). See also Feld,
Juvenile Court Legislative Reform and the Serious Young Offender Disman-
tling the "Rehabilitative Ideal;" 65 MINN. L. REV. 167, 171-72 (1980)[hereinafter
Feld, Legislative Reform]; Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of Of-
fense: Punishmen Treatmen and the Difference it Makes, 68 B.U.L. REV. 821,
909-15 (1988) [hereinafter Feld, Principle of Offense); McCarthy, Should Juvenile
Delinquency be Abolished 23 CRIM & DELINQ. 196 (1977); Shepherd, Challeng-
ing the Rehabilitative Justificationfor Indeterminate Sentencing in the Juvenile
Justice System- The Right to Punishment, 21 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 12, 14-19 (1977);
Wizner & Keller, The Penal Model of Juvenile Justice: Is Juvenile Court Delin-
quency Jurisdiction Obsolete?, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1112, 1132-35 (1977).
In reaction to the majority's imposition of a punitive sanction (ie., short-term
institutionalization) on a juvenile offender, a Minnesota appellate judge in In re
D.S.F., 416 N.W.2d 772, 777 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987)(Crippen, J., dissenting), sug-
gested that the abolition of the juvenile court should be given serious considera-
tion in order to secure constitutional protections for young offenders. Of course,
not all commentators who are dissatisfied with the juvenile justice system call for
its abolition. For example, Melton, Taking Gault Seriously: Toward a New Juve-
nile Court, 68 NEB. L. REV. 146 (1989), presents an argument for greater expan-
sion of due process protections for juveniles in the context of existing juvenile
court structures.
12. Feld, Principle of Offense, supra note 11, at 885-89; K. Federle, supra note 11, at
11. Much of the scholarship in this area has been the product of sociologists and
criminologists who use a labeling theory approach to explain the problem. In
brief, labeling theory suggests that differential dispositions are a function of read-
ily identifiable, offender characteristic--e-g., race and socioeconomic status--that
have little or nothing to do with either the offense committed or the future reha-
bilitation prospects of the juvenile. However, these easily identified attributes
are used, either consciously or unconsciously, by decisionmakers as they make
attributions of legal responsibility and culpability. See, eg., M. BORTNER, INSIDE
A JUVENILE COURT. THE TARNISHED IDEAL OF INDrvmUALZED JUSTICE (1982); A.
1990]
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is part of a broader problem in the criminal justice system;13 using this
type of readily identifiable information inevitably leads to unjust, dis-
criminatory decisionmaking.14
The allegation being levied is that a justice system that explicitly
calls for the use of offender information is a system that is vulnerable
to non-rational decisionmaking.S If juvenile justice decisionmaking is
CICOUREL, THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF JUVENILE JUSTICE (1968); R. EMERSON,
JUDGING DELINQUENTS: CONTEXT AND PROCESS IN JUVENILE COURT (1969); J.
MARTIN, TOWARD A POLITICAL DEFINITION OF DELINQUENCY (1970); D. MATZA,
DELINQUENCY AND DRIFT (1964); E. SCHU, RADICAL NON-INTERVENTION: RE-
THINKING THE DELINQUENCY PROBLEM (1973)[hereinafter E. SCHUR, RADICAL
NON-INTERVENTION]; Hagan, The Labelling Perspective, the Delinquen and the
Police, 14 CAN. J. CRIMINOLOGY & CORRECTIONS 150 (1972); Hirsch!, Labelling
Theory and Juvenile Delinquency: An Assessment of the Evidence, in LABELLING
OF DEVIANCE: EVALUATING A PERSPECTIVE 271 (W. Gove ed. 2d ed. 1980); Maho-
ney, The Ffect of Labelling Upon Youths in the Juvenile Justice System: A Re-
view of the Evidence, 8 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 583 (1973); Wellford, Labelling Theory
and Criminology: An Assessment, 22 Soc. PROBS. 332 (1975). See generally H1
BECKER, OUTSIDERS: STUDIES IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF DEVIANCE (1963); W. CHAM-
BLISS & C. SEIDMAN, LAW, ORDER, AND POWER (1971); R. QuINNEY, SOCIAL REAL-
try OF CRIME (1970); E. SCHUR, LABELING DEVIANT BEHAVIOR: ITS SOCIOLOGICAL
IMPLICATIONS (1971); Gibbs, Conceptions of Deviant Behavior: The Old and the
New, 9 PAC. SOC. REV. 9 (1966); Gove, The Labelling Perspective: An Overview,
in LABELLING OF DEVIANCE: EVALUATING A PERSPECTIVE 9 (W. Gove ed. 2d ed.
1980); Gove, Postscript to Labelling and Crime, in LABELLING OF DEVIANCE:
EVALUATING A PERSPECTIVE 264 (W. Gove ed. 2d ed. 1980); Hagan, Extra-Legal
Attributes and Criminal Sentencing: An Assessment of a Sociological Viewpoint,
8 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 357 (1974) [hereinafter Hagan, Extra-Legal Attributes]; Ki-
tuse, The 'NWew Conception of Deviance" and Its Critics, in LABELLING OF DEVI-
ANCE: EVALUATING A PERSPECTIVE 381 (W. Gove ed. 2d ed. 1980); Schur,
Comments, in LABELLING OF DEVIANCE: EVALUATING A PERSPECTIVE 393 (W.
Gove ed. 2d ed. 1980); Tittle, Labelling and Crime: An Empirical Evaluation, in
LABELLING OF DEVIANCE: EVALUATING A PERSPECTIVE 241 (W. Gove ed. 2nd ed.
1980); Ward, The Labelling Theory: A Critical Analysis, 9 CRIMINOLOGY 268
(1971).
13. The distinction between legal and extra-legal information was initially formu-
lated in the criminal sentencing context. In sentencing decisions, criminologists
used the term extra-legal to "refer to perceived characteristics of the offender
which are legally irrelevant to the imposition of sentence." Hagan, Extra-Legal
Attributes, supra note 12, at 380 n.1. Perceived characteristics of the offender
which have been deemed inappropriate include not only demographic character-
istics such as race, sex, age, and socioeconomic status, but also have included of-
fender characteristics such as attitude, demeanor, intelligence, maturity, and
socialization, to name but a few. See supra note 12 for sociological and crimino-
logical references cited therein. It is interesting that the latter set of characteris-
tics traditionally have been considered to be precisely those characteristics which
a juvenile justice decisionmaker should consider when making a legal decision
about a juvenile. This has led some to question the use of the concept "extra-
legal" in the context of juvenile justice decisionmaking. E.g., Horwitz & Wasser-
man, Some Misleading Conceptions in Sentencing Research: An Example and a
Reformulation in the Juvenile Court, 18 CRIMINOLOGY 411 (1980).
14. See supra note 12.
15. See, e.g., Feld, Principle of Offense, supra note 11. See generally M. GOTrFRED-
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inherently more susceptible to the use of evidence that is not properly
considered in legal proceedings, perhaps it is necessary to return to a
unitary criminal justice system in which it is clear that reliance on
offender characteristics such as race is impermissible.16 However, the
use of offender characteristic information does not inevitably lead to
unjust decisionmaking. As Horwitz and Wasserman point out, the ju-
venile justice system's reliance on offender information is necessary to
make appropriate judgments concerning proper treatment of an of-
fender.1 7 Thus, the use of offender information may be consistent
with desirable practices, or it may be reflective of inappropriate atten-
tion to impermissible factors.
An empirical approach is useful for addressing the question of the
extent to which offender information and offense information contrib-
ute to juvenile justice decisions. Social scientific studies can quantify
the extent to which decisions can be accounted for by various sets of
variables. Empirical studies can reveal the extent to which offender
information variables and offense information variables statistically
contribute to disposition judgments.18 The data from such studies can
provide information for the legislative debate over whether, and if so
how, to modify the juvenile justice system. The data can also aid
judges in determining whether practices in juvenile justice comport
with the trade-off of a separate justice system for juveniles in return
for decisionmaking that promotes rehabilitation values over
punishment.19
This Article will present a study of disposition judgments made by
juvenile justice professionals. The empirical evidence reported here
suggests that both offender characteristic data and offense characteris-
tic data contribute significantly and substantially to disposition judg-
ments. The data also suggest that there is an appropriate reliance on
SON & D. GOTrFREDSON, DECISIONMAKMG IN CRIMINAL JusTIcE: TOWARD THE
RATIONAL EXERCISE OF DISCREION (1980).
16. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 108 S. Ct. 1756 (1987)(detailed examination of claim
that race influenced death penalty decisionmaking in Georgia).
17. Horwitz & Wasserman, Formal Rationality, Substantive Justice, and Discrimi-
nation: A Study of a Juvenile Court, 4 LAw & Hum. BEHAV. 103, 105 (1980). See
also J. Ito & V. Stapleton, The Role of Court Type in Juvenile Court Disposi-
tional Outcome (paper presented at the meeting of the Southern Sociological So-
ciety, Louisville, Kentucky, Apr. 1981)(offender characteristics can be subdivided
into discriminatory variables, such as race and gender, and into non-discrimina-
tory, "discretionary" variables, such as family composition and whether the juve-
nile is currently in school).
18. See Grisso, Tomkins & Casey, Psychosocial Concepts in Juvenile Law, 12 LAW &
HUM. BEHAv. 403 (1988). See also Feld, Principle of Offense, supra note 11, at
879-89. See generally Barton, Discretionary Decision-Making in Juvenile Jus-
tice, 22 CRIME & DELUNQ. 470 (1976); Lamiell, Discretion in Juvenile Justice A
Framework for Systematic Study, 6 CRim. JUST. & BEHAv. 76 (1979).
19. See, ag., Feld, Principle of Offense, supra note 11. See also infra notes 141-43 and
accompanying text.
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both types of data in dispositional decisionmaking, there is neither an
over-reliance nor an under-reliance on either type of information
category.
Part II will briefly review the history of discretionary decisionmak-
ing in the juvenile justice system. I will argue that by providing juve-
nile justice professionals broad discretion in their decisions, the
juvenile system opened itself to the explicit reliance on offender infor-
mation. However, the changes imposed on the juvenile justice system
in the wake of U.S. Supreme Court decisions in the 1960's and 1970's
resulted in a need for reliance on offense information to a much
greater extent than previously required. The balance of offender and
offense considerations that the Court has implicitly called for in its
decisions would seem to allow juvenile justice professionals to use
both offender and offense characteristics in decisionmaking so long as
offense information accounts for a meaningful proportion of judgment
variation.20
Part III describes an empirical research study that examined the
20. The concept of "variation" has several different roles in statistics. See P. ROBIN-
SON, FUNDAMENTALS OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 88-116 (2d ed. 1981). As a
descriptive statistic, variance is a quantitative summary of dispersion among a set
of measures or scores. It is a tool for communicating the extent to which various
measures or scores "deviate," that is, differ, from one another. See, e.g., D.
BARNES, STATISTICS As PROOF. FUNDAMENTALS OF QUANTITATIVE EVIDENCE 75-
80 (1983); J. MONAHAN & L. WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALs 69-73 (2d ed. 1990). One often finds the terms variation and variance
used interchangeably; however, as P. ROBINSON, supra, at 97, noted. "Variance
and variation while synonymous are not exactly equal terms.... [Variance is
only one of several statistical ways of representing variation."
In the context used here, decision "variation" refers to dispersion in disposi-
tion decisions made about juveniles. Often, the set of decisions (i.&, the measures
or scores under examination) are described in terms of means or proportions (eg.,
30% of delinquents were given out-of-home dispositions). To understand the con-
cept of decision variance as used in this Article, consider a set of dichotomous
disposition decisions in a hypothetical study of 100 juvenile dispositions. For each
juvenile adjudicated delinquent, there is the option of placing the juvenile out-of-
home (coded using the number "0") or keeping the juvenile in his or her home
(coded as "1"). For the 100 juvenile dispositions examined, we can calculate the
difference between each juvenile's particular disposition (coded as 0 or 1) and the
mean of all 100 juveniles' "scores," that is, the sum of all 100 juveniles' disposi-
tions divided by 100. This procedure provides a difference or deviation score for
each juvenile. If we simply add all 100 difference scores together, the sum would
be zero. (By definition of the concept "mean," half the scores are greater than
the mean and half are less. Subtracting the mean value from each individual
score and adding the results together therefore sums to zero.)
However, if we square each deviation score before we add them together, we
will obtain a value that is greater than zero. This value, that is, the total sum of
the squared deviation scores, is commonly referred to as the total sum of squares.
This also can be thought of as the total variation in the data set, or in the context
of the hypothetical study of juvenile justice disposition decisions, the total deci-
sion variation. The sum of squares concept is nicely illustrated in an experimen-
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use of offender and offense information in dispositional decisionmak-
ing. The disposition research was part of a larger study that examined
the use of psychosocial information in three areas of juvenile justice
decisionmaking pre-trial detentions; transfers or waivers from the ju-
venile justice system to criminal justice jurisdiction; and post-adjudica-
tion dispositions.21 I will briefly provide an overview of the larger
research project before focusing on the disposition study.
Finally, in Parts IV-VI, I will examine some of the implications of
the disposition study. I conclude that the research data reported here
indicates that, on the whole, the juvenile justice system is attentive to
the types of information to which it should be, given its dual purposes
of being a justice system as well as a treatment system. I also discuss
how to use empirical research to examine and even alter a deci-
sionmaker's use of offender and offense information.
H. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF DECISIONMAKERS'
DISCRETION IN THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM
Since its inception, a hallmark of the juvenile justice system has
been discretionary decisionmaking.22 It was believed that broad lati-
tude in discretion would allow decisionmakers to be benevolent in-
stead of punitive.23 Furthermore, rigid adherence to formal rules
would be more likely to result in harsher treatment of juveniles. Sim-
ilarly, one additional hallmark of the juvenile justice system has been
its focus on the offender rather than on the offense.24 The common
belief was that, if decisionmakers were obliged to focus on the juvenile
rather than on the juvenile's criminal actions, judgments would re-
flect a rehabilitative ideal.
tal context (for the purposes of calculating the one-way analysis of variance
[ANOVA] statistic) in P. ROBINSON, supr at 255-60.
Thus, a task for social scientists is to use predictor variables - in this case,
offender and offense characteristics - to explain whatever proportion of the dis-
position decision (which is termed the outcome or criterion variable) variance
that can be accounted for by the examined variables. This proportion is some-
times referred to as the coefficient of determination. D. BARNES, supra, at 291.
21. Grisso, Tomldns & Casey, supra note 18.
22. D. Rommx, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE: THE ASYLUM AND ITS ALTERNA-
TIVES IN PROGRESSIVE AMERICA 58-60 & 248-60 (1980). For early descriptions of
the need for broad discretion in juvenile court decisionmaking, see generally A.
PLATT, supra note 1; S. SCHLOSSMAN, supra note 1; Flicker, Discretionary Law
for Juveniles, in SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AND DISCRETIONARY LAW 289 (L. Abt & I.
Stuart eds. 1979); Fox, supra note 3. See also THE CHILD, THE CLINIC AND THE
COURT (J. Addams ed. 1925); Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARv. L. REV. 104
(1909).
23. See generally A. PLATr, supra note 1; E. RYERSON, supra note 1; S. ScHLOSsmAN,
supra note 1; JUVENILE JUSTICE: THE PROGRESSIVE LEGACY AND CURRENT RE-
FORMS, supra note 10; JUVENILE JUSTICE PHILOSOPHY: READINGS, CASES AND
COMMENTS, supra note 10; Fox, supra note 3.
24. E.g., E. RYERSON, supra note 1; S. SCHLOSSMAN, supra note 1.
1990]
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The rehabilitative ideal was designed to assist the juvenile in be-
coming a properly socialized member of society. Thus, instead of pun-
ishing a youth who committed a crime, the philosophy was to provide
the juvenile court with sufficient flexibility to fashion a remedial pro-
gram specifically tailored to the unique needs and circumstances of
the youthful offender.25 As Vedder recognized,26 this approach was
consistent with the old "court of equity" model27 upon which the juve-
nile court was based.28 Vedder noted that the juvenile court has be-
come essentially "a court of human relations."29
Thus, in large part, the juvenile justice system was created to pro-
tect juveniles from the consequences associated with conviction in
criminal courts.30 In particular, the juvenile justice system was going
to provide juvenile offenders with an alternative to the harsh penal-
ties meted out to adult offenders. Juveniles were not going to be tried
25. For a general discussion of the philosophies and purposes underlying disposi-
tional options, see generally J. ANDENAES, PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE (1974);
J. FEINBERG, DOING AND DESERVING (1970); H. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPON-
siBrrY (1968); S. KADIsH & M. PAULSEN, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES:
CASES AND MATERIALS 1-71 (1975); A. VON HmscH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE
OF PUNISHMENTS (1976); F. ZIMING & G. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL
THREAT IN CRIME CONTROL (1973). For a discussion of the juvenile justice sys-
tem's rehabilitation ideal, see Ketcham, The Unfulfilled Promise of the American
Juvenile Court, in JusTIcE FOR THE CHILD: THE JUVENILE COURT IN TRANSITION
22 (M. Rosenheim ed. 1963); for a discussion of whether rehabilitation should con-
tinue to be considered a core part of juvenile justice dispositions, compare the
dissenting statements of Judge Polier and Commissioner Wald with the disposi-
tion standard draft approved by the majority of the IJA-ABA Joint Commission
on Juvenile Justice Standards, in INSTITUTE FOR JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION/
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS PROJECT. STAN-
DARDS RELATING To DISPOSITIONS (1980). See also the comments and dissents to
REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, TASK FORCE ON SENTENCING POLICY
TOwARD YOUNG OFFENDERS (1978); Feld, Principle of Offense, supra note 11.
26. B. VEDDER, supra note 1, at 146.
27. It is important to recall that at the time juvenile courts were being established in
the United States, there was almost as much a tradition of courts of equity as
courts of law. Rendleman, supra note 3. In this century, courts of equity have all
but disappeared in the United States. Juvenile courts are one of the last vestiges
of equity court models left in our system, and even some of those who argue for
the continuation of a separate juvenile court nonetheless argue that they should
adopt the characteristics and protections more commonly associated with courts
of law. See, e.g., Melton, supra note 11.
28. See, e.g., Flexner, The Juvenile Court, Its Legal Aspects, 46 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & SOC. SCI. 49 (1910); Rendleman, supra note 3. Cf Beemsterboer, supra
note 10 (juvenile court operated more like the Star Chamber than a court of
equity).
29. G. VEDDER, supra note 1, at 153 (quoting Juvenile Judge Walter E. Beckham of
Miami, Florida). See also THE CHILD, THE CLINIC AND THE COURT, supra note 22;
A. PLATr, supra note 1, at 137-75; E. RYERSON, supra note 1.
30. For early statements of this goal, see W. HEALY, THE INDIVIDUAL DELINQUENT
(1915); T. HURLEY, supra note 10; H. LOU, supra note 10; Lindsey, The Boy and
the Court, 13 CHARITIES 350 (1905); Mack, supra note 22.
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for crimes and have their guilt determined; instead, they were going to
receive a hearing before a benevolent parent-surrogate - the juvenile
court judge - who was to determine whether the youngster needed to
become a ward of the court - an adjudicated delinquent. Delinquent
youths would not be sentenced; instead, they would receive disposi-
tions tailored to their rehabilitation needs.31 Thus, it was less impor-
tant whether dispositions were commensurate with juveniles' offenses
so long as they were consistent with the juveniles' treatment needs.3 2
Consequently, juvenile court decisionmaking was characterized by
a considerable amount of discretion.33 The court's discretionary deci-
sionmaking was fueled to a great extent by information it received
about a juvenile and was frequently only tangentially related to the
juvenile's offense.3 4
A. The Use of Psychosocial Information About the Offender in Juvenile
Justice Decisionmaking
The juvenile court was accorded a considerable amount of discre-
tion in reaching its determinations about juvenile offenders. Decision-
making was typically guided by no more than the requirement that
decisions be in the "best interest" of the child.w In order to ascertain
what would be in the best interest of a child, courts have looked to
receive information from those who could assist in determining what
would be best for the child. The broad and vague "best interest" stan-
dard allowed juvenile justice decisionmakers to consider virtually any
31. Part of the unique approach undertaken by those who began the juvenile court
was that juvenile offenders were to be rehabilitated not punished. E.g., W.
HEALY, supra note 30; H. Lou, supra note 10. See generally M. LEVINE & A. LE.
VINE, supra note 10; R. MENNEL, supra note 2; E. RYERSON, supra note 1; S.
SCHLOSSMAN, supra note 1. Cf. A. PLATr, supra note 1 (rehabilitation was stated
as a goal, but juveniles were nonetheless punished).
32. For detailed discussions of the purposes of the juvenile court, the way courts actu-
ally operated, and the roles adopted by various court officials including judges,
probation officers, and attorneys, see, eg., THE CHILD, THE CLINIc AND THE
COURT, supra note 22; A. PLATT, supra note 1; E. RYERSON, supra note 1; S.
SCHLOSSMAN, supra note 1.
33. See supra sources cited in note 22.
34. See, eg., M. BORTNER, supra note 12; A. CICOUREL, supra note 12; R. EMERSON,
supra note 12; D. MATzA, supra note 12.
35. For discussions and analyses of the best interests standard, see generally J. GOLD-
STEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIr, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1973);
J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNrr, BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
(1979); J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD, A. SoLNIT & S. GOLDSTEIN, IN TH BEST INTER-
ESTS OF THE CHILD (1986). For a criticism of Goldstein's and his colleagues' for-
mulation of the best interests notion and a criticism of courts' use of and reliance
on their formulation, see Davis, "There is a book out . .". An Analysis of Judicial
Absorption of.Legislative Facts, 100 HARv. L. REV. 1539 (1987). For a different




information that they deemed relevant. The ultimate goal of the juve-
nile court was to formulate a treatment plan that addressed the partic-
ularized needs of the juvenile who came before the judge.3 6
Naturally, social service and mental health professionals became
principal participants in the juvenile justice decisiornmaking process.3 7
In fact, within a decade of the creation of the Chicago juvenile court,
psychiatrist William Healy was asked to establish a child guidance
clinic to assist the juvenile court in making decisions about juvenile
offenders.3 8 It was believed that mental health perspectives would
allow juvenile courts to be on the "cutting edge" of scientific break-
throughs that would address such major concerns as the causes and
treatment of juvenile delinquency.39 It was thought that social scien-
tific and mental health information would provide juvenile court deci-
sionmakers with the ability to make "correct" decisions about the
juveniles who came before them and to accurately develop the treat-
36. See, e.g., W. HEALY, supra note 30; W. HEALY, MENTAL CONFLICTS AND MISCON-
DUCT (1917); W. HEALY & A. BRONNER, DELINQUENTS AND CRIMINALS: THEIR
MAKING AND UNMAKING (1926) [hereinafter W. HEALY & A. BRONNER, DELI-
QUENTS AND CRIMINALS]; W. HEALY & A. BRONNER, NEW LIGHT ON DELINQUENCY
AND ITS TREATMENT (1936) [hereinafter W. HEALY & A. BRONNER, NEW LIGHT ON
DELIQUENCY]. See also R. MENNEL, supra note 2; E. RYERSON, supra note 1; S.
SCHLOSSMAN, supra note 1.
37. M. LEVINE & A. LEVINE, supra note 10; R. MENNEL, supra note 2.
38. R. MENNEL, supra note 2, at 161-69. Dr. Healy not only established assessment
and treatment clinics, first in Chicago and then in Boston, but he also used these
settings as laboratories for research into the causes of and solutions to delin-
quency. See F. ALEXANDER & W. HEALY, ROOTS OF CRIME: PSYCHOANALYTIC
STUDIES (1935); W. HEALY, supra note 30; W. HEALY, supra note 36; W. HEALY &
A. BRONNER, DELINQUENTS AND CRIMINALS, supra note 36; W. HEALY & A. BRON-
NER, NEW LIGHT ON DELINQUENTCY, supra note 36. Dr. Healy was not the only
mental health professional conducting such inquiries; numerous psychologists,
psychiatrists, sociologists, and social workers were also studying the causes and
treatments of delinquency. See, e.g., A. AICHORN, WAYWARD YOUTH (1935); E.
BURLEIGH & F. HARMS, THE DELINQUENT GIRL (1923); E. COOLEY, PROBATION
AND DELINQUENCY (1927); FIvE HUNDRED DELINQUENT WOMEN (1934); S. GLUECK
& E. GLUECK, 500 CRIMINAL CAREERS (1930); S. GLUECK & E. GLUECK, ONE THOU-
SAND JUVENILE DELINQUENTS: THEIR TREATMENT BY COURT AND CLINIC (1934);
S. GLUECK & E. GLUECK, UNRAVELING JUVENILE DELINQUENCY (1950); G. HALL,
ADOLESCENCE: ITS PSYCHOLOGY AND ITS RELATIONS TO PHYSIOLOGY, ANTHRO-
POLOGY, SOCIOLOGY, SEX, CRIME, RELIGION AND EDUCATION (1904); G. HALL,
YOUTH: ITS EDUCATION, REGIMEN, AND HYGIENE (1906); J. PUFFER, THE BOY AND
His GANG (921); C. ROGERS, THE CLINICAL TREATMENT OF THE PROBLEM CHILD
(1939); C. SHAw, DELINQUENCY AREAS (1929); C. SHAW, THE JACK-ROLLER: A
DELINQUENT BOY'S OWN STORY (1930); C. SHAw & H. McKAY, SOCIAL FACTORS IN
JUVENILE DELINQUENCY (1931); W. THOMAS, THE UNADJUSTED GIRL (1923); F.
THRASHER, THE GANG: A STUDY OF 1,313 GANGS IN CHICAGO (1927); M. VAN WA-
TERS, YOUTH IN CONFLICT (1925). See generally R. MENNEi, supra note 2; E. RY-
ERSON, supra note 1; Van Waters, The Juvenile Court as a Social Laboratory, 7 J.
APPLIED Soc. 318 (1923).
39. See supra sources cited in note 38. See generally R. MENNEL, supra note 2; A.
PLAT, supra note 1; E. RYERSON, supra note 1; S. SCHLOSSMAN, supra note 1.
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ment plans that were required to rehabilitate delinquent youths.40
Sometimes called the "discretionary, medical model of juvenile jus-
tice,"4 1 the juvenile court became, in effect, a mental health agency
armed with the legitimized authority of law. The court asked for and
received information about the offender. Such information included
not only information pertaining directly to the offender such as moti-
vation to change, alcohol and drug use, and psychiatric history, but
also information about the offender's family, friends, and social envi-
ronment. The information provided the juvenile court judge - "de-
scriptions of juveniles' needs, character, and treatment prospects" -
would be difficult to distinguish from the information provided to a
psychologist, psychiatrist, or social worker charged with the responsi-
bility of deciding what to do with a youngster.42
This use of psychosocial information in juvenile court decisionmak-
ing has continued and is still used today.43 However, due in large part
to the legal reforms of the 1960's and 1970's that resulted from United
States Supreme Court's consideration of practices and procedures
used in the juvenile justice system, there has emerged a greater focus
on information that is generally considered more legal in nature.
Such information includes the nature of the present offense, premedi-
tation of the present offense, and any past offenses. The move to
greater reliance on legal information will be discussed in the next
section.
B. The Use of Legal Information About the Offense in Juvenile Justice
Decisionmaking
By the 1960s, it had become apparent that the juvenile justice sys-
tem was not working as well as its conceptualizers had hoped. The
treatment and rehabilitation ideals were not being met. Often, offend-
ers who entered the system were trapped between its cracks. Almost
as if they were caught in a "no-man's land" of governmental interven-
40. Miriam Van Waters, a sociologist, juvenile judge, and a leading figure in juvenile
justice and corrections, went so far as to advocate that juvenile court hearing of-
ficers ought to be trained in the social sciences such as psychology in addition to
the law. See Van Waters, The Socialization of Juvenile Court Procedures, 12 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 61 (1922). See generally B. ROwLES, supra note 10 (biog-
raphy of Van Waters).
41. Morse & Whitebread, Mental Health Implications of the Juvenile Justice Stan-
dards, in LEGAL REFORMS AFFECTING CHILD AND YOUTH SERVICES 5 (G. Melton
ed. 1982).
42. Grisso, Tomkins & Casey, supra note 18, at 404 (citing W. HEALY, supra note 30;
R. MENNEL, supra note 2; E. RYERSON, supra note 1; S. ScHLossmAN, supra note
1).
43. See, e.g., Grisso, Tomkins & Casey, supra note 18. See generally G. MELTON, J.
PETRILA, N. POYTHRESS & C. SLOBOGIN, PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE
COURTS 296-307 (1987).
1990]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:298
tion, juveniles were subject to deprivations of liberty without access to
constitutional protections afforded adult offenders and without giving
them the promised benefits of effective treatment. The juvenile jus-
tice system seemed to be offering offenders the worst of both the legal
and the social service systems. 44
In recognition of this and other problems, public officials, blue-rib-
bon panels, and interested commentators from both the social sciences
and the legal system began to call for the elimination of or radical
change to the juvenile justice system.4 5 State and federal courts began
to uphold the claims of juveniles who sued on constitutional and statu-
tory grounds for the applications of adult legal protections to the juve-
nile justice process. 46
44. As the Court concluded after examining much of the available assessments and
commentary in its consideration of the juvenile transfer case, Kent v. United
States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966)(citations omitted): "There is evidence ... that
there may be grounds for concern that the child receives the worst of both
worlds: that he gets neither the protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous
care and regenerative treatment postulated for children."
45. E.g., F. ALLEN, THE BORDERLAND OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: ESSAYS IN LAw AND
CRIMINOLOGY (1964); JUSTICE FOR THE CHILD: THE JUVENILE COURT IN TRANSI-
TION (M. Rosenheim ed. 1962); J. POLIER, A VIEW FROM THE BENCH (1964); PRESI-
DENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMNSTRATION OF JUSTICE,
TASK FORCE REPORT: JUvENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME (1967); An-
tineau, Constitutional Rights in Juvenile Courts, 46 CORNELL L. Q. 387 (1961);
Arnold, Juvenile Justice in Transition, 14 UCLA L. REv. 1144 (1957); Beem-
sterboer, supra note 10; Caldwell, supra note 10; Glueck, Some "Unfinished Busi-
ness" in the Management of Juvenile Delinquency, 15 SYRACUSE L. REv. 628
(1964); Handler, supra note 10; Lemert, supra note 10; Lemert, Legislating
Change in the Juvenile Court, 1967 WIs. L. REv. 421; Nunberg, Problems in the
Structure of the Juvenile Court, 48 J. CRM. LAW, CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 500
(1958); Yablonsky, The Role of Law and Social Science in the Juvenile Court, 67
COLUM. L. REv. 281 (1967); Comment, Criminal Offenders in the Juvenile Court"
More Brickbats and Another Proposal, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 1171 (1966); Note, Juve-
nile Delinquents: The Police, State Courts, and Individualized Justice, 79 HARV.
L. REV. 775 (1966); Note, Rights and Rehabilitation in the Juvenile Courts, 67
COLUM. L. REV. 281 (1967).
46. For example, several courts held that the right to counsel is available to juvenile
offenders. See, e.g., Black v. United States, 355 F.2d 104 (D.C. Cir. 1965); In re
Castro, 243 Cal. App. 2d 467, 52 Cal. Rptr. 469 (1966); In re Long, 184 So. 2d 861
(Miss. 1966). Courts also upheld the privilege against self-incrimination or co-
erced confessions. See, e.g., United States v. Morales, 233 F. Supp. 160 (D. Mont.
1964); In re Carlo, 48 N.J. 224, 225 A.2d 110 (1966); In re W., 19 N.Y. 2d 55, 224
N.E.2d 102 (1966). Finally, courts upheld the right to avoid double jeopardy. See,
e.g., Sawyer v. Hauck, 245 F. Supp. 55 (W.D. Tex. 1965). In fact, some courts sug-
gested a general application of due process rights to juveniles. See Harling v.
United States, 295 F.2d 161 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Pee v. United States, 274 F.2d 556
(D.C. Cir. 1959). The trend of providing due process protections was by no means
universal during this period. See, e.g., Application of Gault, 99 Ariz. 181, 407 P.2d
760 (1965)(no right to counsel; no privilege against self-incrimination; no right to
confrontation); In re Castro, 243 Cal. App. 2d, 52 Cal. Rptr. 469 (1966)(no privilege
against self-incrimination); In re Perham, 104 N.H. 276, 184 A.2d 449 (1962)(no
right to trial by jury in juvenile court proceedings).
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These problems with the juvenile justice system were ultimately
addressed by the U.S. Supreme Court. The Supreme Court had previ-
ously provided some indication that juveniles were entitled to consti-
tutional protections of due process in certain circumstances. 47
However, the first cases that directly examined the juvenile justice
system were not decided until after the groundswell of criticisms had
become a crescendo of opinion that converged on the realization that
"[a]lthough the juvenile-court system had its genesis in the desire to
provide a distinctive procedure and setting to deal with the problems
of youth,... there [was] a gap between the originally benign concep-
tion of the system and its realities."48
In the decade between 1965 and 1975, the Supreme Court carved
out the constitutional boundaries that would apply to juveniles. Not-
ing that "[d]ue process of law is the primary and indispensable founda-
tion of individual freedom,"4 9 the Court issued numerous rulings
providing a broad range of basic due process protections for juveniles
in the context of transfer and adjudication hearings. These historic
rulings began with the seminal case of Kent v. United States.50 In
Kent, the Court noted that the decision whether to transfer a juvenile
to the jurisdiction of the criminal court required adherence to "proce-
dural regularity sufficient in the particular circumstances to satisfy
the basic requirements of due process and fairness"51 notwithstanding
the need for judicial discretion in the judgment. In re Gault52 ex-
tended the Kent analysis and provided juveniles with the right of writ-
ten notice of charges, the right to counsel, the privilege against self-
incrimination, and the rights to confrontation and cross-examination
of witnesses.53 The right to have a conviction supported by proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt was applied to "the adjudicatory stage of a
delinquency proceeding" in In re Winship.54 Finally, in Breed v.
47. E.g., Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948)(prohibiting the use of a 16 year old murder
suspect's coerced confession). See also Gallegos v. Colarado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962). In
Justice Fortas' opinion in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967), he noted that these
cases, along with Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966), "unmistakably indi-
cate that, whatever may be their precise impact, neither the Fourteenth Amend-
ment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone." However, this proposition was
not really evident until the Court's decision in Gault. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 52-53.
48. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 528 (1975).
49. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 20 (1967). In fact, the Gault opinion noted the founda-
tional importance of procedure to law, analogizing it to the scientific method for
scientific inquiries. Id. at 21.
50. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
51. Id. at 553.
52. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
53. Id. at 31-57.
54. 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970). The Court deemed the application of the reasonable
doubt standard to be such an important ingredient in the "essentials of due pro-
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Jones,55 the right not to be exposed to double jeopardy was held to be
applicable to juveniles. Even though juveniles are subject to the juris-
dictions of two different systems, the Breed Court held that it must be
determined prior to a trial or adjudicatory hearing whether a state
"wants to treat a juvenile within the juvenile-court system before en-
tering upon a proceeding that may result in an adjudication that he
has violated a criminal law."5 6
With a broad range of constitutional rights now applicable to
juveniles, it was finally true that the guarantees of the Bill of Rights
were not to be enjoyed solely by adults.57 Although juveniles charged
with crimes were not given the full range of constitutional protections
available to adult offenders,58 the Court required that juvenile justice
proceedings "measure up to the essentials of due process and fair
treatment."59 In other words, procedures used in juvenile justice pro-
ceedings must be "compatible with the 'fundamental fairness' de-
manded by the Due Process Clause" of the fourteenth amendment. 60
The extension of constitutional guarantees to juveniles provided
young offenders with some of the same checks and balances against
inappropriate state actions as are afforded adults. These rulings
meant that juvenile courts were explicitly required to consider legal
information such as the type and seriousness of the offense. Juvenile
court attention to such information would prevent appellate courts
from overturning the trial court's decision under due process theories.
However, these new due process applications were not meant to
undercut the basic social welfare orientation that had characterized
the juvenile justice system since its inception. For example, in Schall
v. Martin, the Court pointedly noted that the due process movement
was not meant to undercut the parens patriae philosophy at the root
of the juvenile justice system, as this feature is what "makes a juvenile
cess and fair treatment" that it gave the ruling in Winship "complete retroactive
effect." Ivan V. v. City of New York, 407 U.S. 203, 205 (1972)(per curiam).
55. 421 U.S. 519 (1975).
56. Id. at 537-38.
57. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967). See supra note 47.
58. For example, the right to a trial by jury was held not to apply to juvenile proceed-
ings. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971). As Justice Rehnquist indi-
cated in the majority's opinion in Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 263
(1984) (citations omitted):
[Tihe Constitution does not mandate elimination of all differences in the
treatment of juveniles.... The State has "a parens patriae interest in
preserving and promoting the welfare of the child" which makes a juve-
nile proceeding fundamentally different from an adult criminal trial.
We have tried, therefore, to strike a balance - to respect the "informal-
ity" and "flexibility" that characterize juvenile proceedings, and yet to
ensure that such proceedings comport with the "fundamental fairness"
demanded by the Due Process Clause.
59. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 562 (1966).
60. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 268 (1984).
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proceeding fundamentally different from an adult criminal trial."61
State legislative actions and court decisions in the wake of Kent,
Gault, and their progeny attempted to provide for both the legal rights
and the mental health and rehabilitative interests of juveniles.6 2 Con-
sequently, discretion has remained a mainstay in juvenile justice deci-
sionmaking possibly because of the usefulness of offense information
in making the due process determinations that are required as a mat-
ter of constitutional law and because of the usefulness of offender in-
formation in making the individualized justice and treatment
determinations that continue to be an integral part of the parens pa-
triae facet of the juvenile justice system.63
C. Post-Adjudication Disposition Decisions: A Particular Case for the
Use of Offender and Offense Information
While it is clear that judicial discretion to use offender and offense
information may occur at any stage of the juvenile court process, the
post-adjudication disposition decision is an especially critical stage in
delinquency proceedings.64 It is the culmination of a series of discre-
tionary decisions made about a youth. At the outset there was a deci-
sion made to officially charge the juvenile with an offense rather than
deal informally with the situation. Furthermore, a decision was made
to handle the case within the juvenile justice system rather than di-
vert the case.6 5 Even after these two critical steps, a disposition deter-
61. Id. at 263.
62. See generally S. DAvis, THE RIGHTS OF JuvENILEs: THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYS.
TM (2d ed. 1984); P. PImRSMA, J. GANousIs, A. VOLENIK, H. SWANGER & P. CoN-
NELL, LAW AND TACTICS IN JUVENILE CASES (3d ed. 1977).
63. See, eg., Barton, supra note 18; Flicker, supra note 22; Grisso & Conlin, Proce-
dural Issues in the Juvenile Justice System, in CHnREN, MENTAL HEALTH, AND
THE LAW 171 (N. Reppucci, L. Weithorn, E. Mulvey & J. Monahan eds. 1984);
Rubin, The Juvenile Courts, in THE COURTS: THE FULCRUM OF THE JUSTICE SYS-
TEMi 66 (T. Rubin ed. 1976). See generally K. DAVIS, DIsCREIONARY JUSTICE: A
PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (1977); M. GoTrFEDsoN & D. GOTTFREDSON, supra note
15.
64. E.g., Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 259 n.8 (1984)(the Court noted in dictum that
"[t]he dispositional hearing is the final and most important proceeding in the [ju-
venile court]"); A.A. v. State, 538 P.2d 1004, 1005 (Alaska 1975). See also W.
WADLINGTON, C. WHITEBREAD & S. DAVIs, CHILDREN IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM 550
(1983); Flicker, supra note 22, at 299; Piersma, Ganousis & Kramer, The Juvenile
Court. Current Problems, Legislative Proposals, and a Model Act, 20 ST. LOUIS
U.L.J. 1, 43 (1975).
65. See generally 1 C. SMITH, T. BLACK & F. CAMPBELL, A NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF
CASE DISPOSITION AND CLASSIFICATION IN THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM: INCON-
SISTENT LABELLING-PROCESS DESCRIPTION AND SUMMARY (1979); Palmer &
Lewis, A Differentiated Approach to Juvenile Diversion, 17 J. RES. CRIME & DE-
LINQ. 209 (1980); Zatz, Problems and Issues in Deinstitutionalization: Historical
Overview and Current Attitudes, in NErrHER ANGELS OR THIEVES: STUDIES IN
THE DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION OF STATUS OFFENDERS 14 (J. Handler & J. Zatz
eds. 1982).
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ruination was made only if the offender remained in the juvenile
justice system rather than being transferred to the criminal justice
systemr6 and was adjudicated delinquent.67 Although the vast major-
ity of juveniles are ushered out of the system beforehand, for those
juveniles who make it to disposition, their involvement in the system
is considerable.68
To date, the Supreme Court has not considered a dispositional case
from the juvenile justice system. However, the Court has recently
dealt with the issue of the death penalty for juvenile defendants69
whose cases were transferred to criminal courts.70 In these cases, the
Court confronted some of the conflicts that arise when discussing ap-
propriate dispositional alternatives for juveniles.
The difficulties of determining an appropriate disposition for a ju-
venile - even one who has committed an especially "brutal murder
... [in which] the victim had been shot twice, [had] his throat, chest,
and abdomen... cut[,] had multiple bruises and a broken leg[, and had
his body] chained to a concrete block and thrown into a river" - is
evident from the Court's analysis in Thompson v. Oklahoma.7'
Although a majority of justices agreed that the defendant should not
be put to death, there was not a majority of Justices who could agree
why. The four Justices who joined in the plurality opinion of the
66. E.g., Feld, The Juvenile Court and the Principle of the Offense: Legislative
Changes in Juvenile Waiver Statutes, 78 J. CRim. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 471 (1978).
67. See generally INSTrrUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMNIsTRATION/AmEmRcAN BAR ASSoCIA-
TION, JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS PROJECT, STANDARDS RELATING TO DIspOsI-
TIONAL PROCEDURES (1977); INSTrrUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION/AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION, JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS PROJECT, THE JUVENILE PRO-
BATION FUNCTION: INTAKE AND PREDISPOSITION INVESTIGATIVE SERVICES pt. I
(1977).
68. E.g., I. SCHWARTZ, supra note 35. Judge Rubin analogized the juvenile justice
system to an inverted pyramid, with two to three million youths a year in contact
with the police, but with only about 100,000 juveniles actually going through the
entire system and being institutionalized. Rubin, supra note 63, at 87.
69. For a review of the history of capital punishments for juveniles in the United
States, see V. STREiB, DEATH PENALTY FOR JUVENILES (1987); Streib, Death Pen-
alty for Children.: Experience with Capital Punishment for Crimes Committed
While Under Age Eighteen, 36 OKLA. L. REV. 613 (1983). See also Ogloff, The
Juvenile Death Penalty: A Frustrated Society's Attempt for Control, 5 BEHAV.
SCI. & L. 447 (1987).
70. Stanford v. Kentucky, 109 S. Ct. 2969 (1989); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct.
2687 (1988); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982). Thompson and Stanford
will be discussed in the text; Eddings will not. In Eddings, the Court held that in
deciding whether to impose the sentence of death on a defendant who was sixteen
years of age at the time of the offense, information about the juvenile's relation-
ship with his family during his youth, that the defendant offered in mitigation,
must be considered. The Court avoided the more difficult issue of whether it is
constitutional to execute a juvenile-offender. See Eddings v. Oklahoma 455 U.S.
104, 120 (1982)(Burger, C.J., dissenting).
71. 108 S. Ct. 2687, 2690 (1988).
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Court indicated that the imposition of capital punishment on a defend-
ant who was fifteen years old at the time he committed the offense
would violate the eighth amendment's prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment. Although the plurality's opinion can be read as
a statement of the lower limit of societal tolerance for the imposition
of death,72 it also can be read as an analysis relevant to juvenile pun-
ishment issues.
Justice Stevens, who wrote the plurality's opinion, indicated that
there is something unique about imposing a disposition on a juvenile.
Although he wrote about it in the context of mitigating circumstances
and penological issues, his analysis recognized that youthful behavior
is different from adult behavior. The analysis suggests that juveniles'
illegal acts are often a function of such factors as lack of maturity;
inexperience; lack of perspective; poor judgment; impulsivity; lack of
self-discipline; a failure of their families, schools, and the social sys-
tem; absence of unfettered free will; great physiological and psycho-
logical stress; reliance on the opinions of their peers; vulnerability to
peer group pressure; a lack of risk aversion; less-than-fully developed
senses of morality and reasoning capacity; and an unrealistic sense of
omnipotence.7 3 In light of these offender characteristics, Justice Ste-
vens argued that notwithstanding the heinous nature of the offense,
juveniles who were under the age of sixteen at the time they commit-
ted their crime should not be put to death.
The Justices who joined the concurring opinion 74 and the dissent-
ing opinion,75 on the other hand, were unconvinced that a juvenile
should not receive the "ultimate punishment" solely because of age.
The dissent focused on the fact that the offense was a brutal, premedi-
tated murder. Among its other arguments, the dissent quoted from
the Justice Department's testimony to the Subcommittee on Criminal
Law of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary76 in which it was noted
that "many juvenile delinquents were 'cynical, street-wise, repeat of-
fenders, indistinguishable, except for their age, from their criminal
counterparts.' "77 The dissent also quoted Justice Powell's dissenting
opinion in Fare v. Michael C: "Minors who become embroiled with
the law range from the very young up to those on the brink of major-
72. See id. at 2691, 2695-96.
73. Id. at 2698-99 (citations omitted). See also Stanford v. Kentucky, 109 S. Ct. 2969,
2988-94 (1989)(Brennan, J., dissenting). In their "evaluation" of such evidence in
Stanford, the plurality termed it "socioscientific" and "ethicoscientific." Id. at
2979.
74. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687, 2708-09, 2711 (1988)(O'Connor, J.
concurring).
75. Id. at 2710-19 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
76. Hearings on S. 829 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Law of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 551 (1983).
77. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687, 2715 (1988)(Scalia, J., dissenting).
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ity. Some of the older minors become fully 'street-wise,' hardened
criminals, deserving no greater consideration than that properly ac-
corded all persons suspected of crime."78 Both the concurring and dis-
senting Justices clearly signalled their willingness to impose adult
sanctions for adult-type offenses.
This orientation prevailed in Stanford v. Kentucky, a consolidated
case in which the Court was confronted with two juvenile murderers,
one of whom shot a gas station attendant "point blank in the face and
then in the back of [the] head," after having first robbed and
sodomized her, and the other of whom robbed and stabbed a salesclerk
at a convenience store and when the victim "began to beg for her life,
[the juvenile] stabbed her four more times in the neck, opening her
carotid artery ... [and left her] to die on the floor."79 If the murder in
Thompson could be labeled a "10" on a ten-point scale of "especially
heinous, atrocious, or cruel"8 0 crimes, then the crimes at the heart of
Stanford might give rise to an additional 10 points on the scale! The
Stanford crimes seemed at least twice as bad as the brutal acts re-
ported in Thompson. Armed with these especially vile, mean-spirited
acts, the majority of the Court found no constitutional barrier to im-
posing the death penalty in Stanford. Given the "better" fact scenario
and given juveniles who were sixteen and seventeen at the time of
their offenses, the focus on the offense rather than on the offender
was unsurprising.
Despite their differences, the analyses in these death penalty cases
are united in their support of the proposition that juveniles are differ-
ent from adults and that this difference is important for dispositional
determinations. Although all of the Justices seem to be in agreement
that a youth's age must be taken into account in deciding whether to
impose the death penalty on him or her,81 there also seems to be a
trend by a majority of the Court toward focusing more on the offense
characteristics than on the offender's characteristics. Nevertheless,
there remains a minority of Justices who reason consistent with the
traditional juvenile court philosophy; not only are juveniles different
from adults, but as a matter of policy, their age difference makes them
78. Id. at 2719 (quoting Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 734 n.4 (1979)(Powell, J.,
dissenting)).
79. 109 S. Ct. 2969, 2973 (1989).
80. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687, 2722 (1988)(Scalia, J., dissenting).
81. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 109 S. Ct. 2969, 2978 (1988); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455
U.S. 104, 115-16 (1982). Because the judgment in Thompson held that the defend-
ant's age prohibited him from being put to death, there was no need for the plu-
rality opinion to assert this proposition. The dissent, however, did reinforce the
view that the youthful age of a defendant should be considered before imposing
the death sentence on a juvenile offender. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct.
2687, 2713 (1988)(Scalia, J., dissenting).
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less blameworthy and more likely to be amenable to treatment and
rehabilitation.
Thus, the Supreme Court's rulings in juvenile death penalty cases
have underscored the continuing importance of offense and offender
information in disposition determinations. However, the Court has
not directly confronted the issue in the juvenile court context.8 2 The
Court has intimated, albeit in dicta, that there should be "an opportu-
nity during the post-adjudicatory or dispositional hearing for a wide-
ranging review of the child's social history and for his individualized
treatment" needs.8 3 Unless the Court holds that the rehabilitation
ideal is irrelevant to juvenile justice dispositions - an improbable
likelihood - some measure of rehabilitation or treatment considera-
tions must be part of dispositional decisionmaking in the near future.
Even the Court's majority opinion in the juvenile, pretrial detention
case, Schall v. Martin,8 4 which was highly critical of traditional juve-
nile justice philosophy and focused primarily on the criminal justice
goal of protection of the community,8 5 did not go so far as to argue for
the elimination of the rehabilitation goal in juvenile justice. Conse-
quently, in light of numerous Supreme Court considerations of juve-
nile disposition issues over nearly twenty-five years, it is reasonable to
assume that juvenile justice disposition decisionmakers will be re-
quired to attend to offender information and will be permitted to at-
tend to offense information.
III. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON DISPOSITIONAL
DECISIONMAKIKNG
A. Previous Empirical Resarch Efforts
Previous research efforts on dispositional decisionmaking have
largely been unable to account for substantial proportions of disposi-
tion decision variation.8 6 A meta-analytic review of twelve disposition
82. The Court has directly commented on dispositional goal differences in the crimi-
nal court versus the juvenile court. See especially In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14-17
(1967). See also id. at 79 (Stewart, J., dissenting): "[A] juvenile proceeding's
whole purpose and mission is the very opposite of the mission and purpose of a
prosecution in a criminal court. The object of one is correction of a condition.
The object of the other is conviction and punishment for a criminal act." A simi-
lar analysis is found in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 551-52
(1971)(White, J., concurring)(discussing differences between juvenile justice sys-
tem's focus on rehabilitation and reunification with the offender's family as soon
as possible and the criminal justice system's focus on punishment and
retribution).
83. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 366 (1970).
84. 467 U.S. 253 (1984).
85. Id. at 264-74.
86. The disposition studies are discussed ifira note 87. The concepts of "variation"
and "proportion of variation" are discussed supra note 20.
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decisionmaking studies (see Table 1) revealed that a small portion of
disposition variance, approximately 20%, could be accounted for by the
data the researchers had collected and analyzed.87 In previous studies,
data had been obtained primarily from the archival files in juvenile
87. Until recently, when social scientists integrated a body of empirical literature,
they depended upon their personal abilities to produce a cohesive, meaningful
cumulation of all relevant research results. However, regardless of how well re-
searchers could synthesize the research literature, their integration depended
upon their subjective judgments. It has been argued that it is as inappropriate to
rely upon reviewers' impressions of studies as it would be to use researchers' im-
pressions as a data collection tool in the first instance. For example, it would be
clearly unacceptable for a researcher to "eyeball" the data he or she had collected
in order to determine whether the results were significant. Yet, this qualitative
approach is precisely the type of procedure that has been tolerated in reviews of
empirical literatures. See generally H. COOPER, INTEGRATING RESEARCH: A
GUIDE FOR LITERATURE REVIEws (2d ed. 1989); Jackson, Methods for Integrative
Reviews, 40 REv. EDUC. RES. 438 (1980). Several commentators have argued for
quantitative alternatives to subjective assessments of empirical studies. See, e.g.,
Cooper, Scientific Guidelines for Conducting Integrative Research Reviews, 52
REv. EDUC. RES. 291 (1982); Cooper & Rosenthal, Statistical versus Traditional
Procedures for Summariring Research Findings, 87 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULL. 442
(1980).
The alternative to qualitative cumulating that has received considerable sup-
port is a quantitative technique known as meta-analysis. See generally G. GLASS,
B. MCGAW & M. SMITH, META-ANALYSIS IN SOCIAL RESEARCH (1981); J. HUNTER,
F. SCHMIDT & G. JACKSON, META-ANALYSIS: CUMULATING RESEARCH FINDINGS
ACROSS STUDIES (1982); NEw DIRECTIONS FOR METHODOLOGY OF SOCIAL AND BE-
HAVIORAL SCIENCE: QUANTrrATrVE ASSESSMENT OF RESEARCH DOMAINS (R. Ro-
senthal ed. 1980); R. ROSENTHAL, M-TA-ANAYLTIC PROCEDURES FOR SOCIAL
RESEARCH (1984); Green & Hall, Quantitative Methods for Literature Reviews, 35
ANN. REv. PSYCHOLOGY 37 (1984); Rosenthal, Combining Results ofIndependent
Studies, 85 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULL. 185 (1978). Meta-analysis is the use of statisti-
cal analyses to permit "the quantitative cumulation and analysis of descriptive
statistics across studies." J. HUNTER, F. SCHmIDT & G. JACKSON, supra at 137.
Among the statistics that can be calculated is the average proportion of variation
accounted for by studies, or, in other words, an overall coefficient of determina-
tion. See supra note 20. The overall coefficient of determination is generally
termed the "effect size" in the meta-analytic literature. See generally Hedges,
Estimation of aFfect Size from a Series of Independent Experiments, 92 PSYCHO-
LOGICAL BULL. 490 (1982); Rosenthal & Rubin, Comparing Effect Sizes of In-
dependent Studies, 92 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULL. 500 (1982).
To obtain an overall coefficient of determination for a literature, each study's
coefficient is computed first. As G. GLASS, B. MCGAw & M. SMITH, supra, at 151,
observed, "There usually is an algebraic path from the reported statistics [in a
study] to a Pearson correlation [i.e., a coefficient of determination] or an approxi-
mation to one." Many statistical texts provide the formulas needed to allow one
to convert most statistics reported in a study into a coefficient of determination.
See G. GLASS, B. MCGAw & M. SMITH, supra, at 149-50. See generally G. GLASS &
J. C. STANLEY, STATISTICAL METHODS IN EDUCATION AND PSYCHOLOGY (1970); W.
HAYS, STATISTICS (3d ed. 1981); L. MARAScuILo & J. LEviN, MULTivARIATE STA-
TISTICS IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES: A RESEARCHER'S GUIDE (1983); B. TABACHNICK
& L. FIDELL, USING MULTIVARIATE STATISTICS (2d ed. 1989). Once the coeffi-
cients of determination are obtained for each study, they can be combined to pro-
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courts or other branches of the law enforcement system including po-
duce one, quantitative estimate of the proportion of variation accounted for by all
the studies combined together.
In order to determine the average proportion of decision variation accounted
for by empirical studies of juvenile justice dispositions, I conducted a meta-analy-
sis of the empirical disposition literature. The data base for this meta-analysis
were disposition studies published during a twenty-five year period. A. Tomkins,
A Study of Postadjudication Disposition Decisions Using the Framework of So-
cial Judgment Theory 19-85 (1984)(unpublished doctoral dissertation, Depart-
ment of Psychology, Washington University)(review of disposition studies
published between 1960 and 1984). See also Feld, Principle of Offense, supra note
11, at 879-89 (reviewing much of the same literature plus a few, more recent dis-
position studies). The data-base of studies reviewed were reported in M.
BORTNER, supra note 12; A. CICOUREL, supra note 12; L. COHEN, DELINQUENCY
DISPOSITIONS: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF PROCESSING DECISIONS IN THREE JU-
VENILE COURTS (1975); R. EMERSON, supra note 12; M. WOLFGANG, R. FIGLIO & T.
SELLiN, DELINQUENCY IN A BIRTH COHORT (1972); Ariessobn, Offense vs. Offender
in Juvenile Court, 23 Juv. JUST. 17 (1972); Arnold, Race and Ethnicity Relative to
Other Factors in Juvenile Court Dispositions, 77 AM. J. Soc. 211 (1971); Bailey &
Peterson, Legal versus Extra-Legal Determinants of Juvenile Court Dispositions,
32 Juv. & FAM. CT. J. 41 (1981); Carter, Juvenile Court Dispositions: A Compari-
son of Status and Nonstatus Offenders, 17 CRIMINOLOGY 341 (1979); Chused, The
Juvenile Court Process: A Study of Three New Jersey Counties, 26 RUTGERS L.J.
488 (1973); Clarke & Koch, Juvenile Court: Therapy or Crime Control, and Do
Lawyers Make a Difference?, 14 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 263 (1980); Cohen & Kluegel,
Determinants of Juvenile Court Dispositions: Ascriptive and Achieved Factors
in Two Metropolitan Courts, 43 AM. SOC. REV. 162 (1978); Cohn, Criteria for the
Probation Offjcer's Recommendations to the Juvenile Court Judge, 9 CRIME &
DELINQ. 262 (1963); Copeland, Juvenile Delinquency 'Referrals' and Their Effect
on Dispositions, 1 AM. J. CRIM. L. 296 (1972); Ferdinand & Luchterhand, Inner-
City Youth, the Police Juvenile Court and Justice, 17 Soc. PROBS. 510 (1970);
Ferster & Courtless, Pre-Dispositional Data, Role of Counsel and Deci.ions in a
Juvenile Court, 7 LAw & SOC'Y REV. 195 (1972); Gross, The Prehearing Juvenile
Report: Probation Offcers' Conceptions, 4 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 212 (1967);
Horwitz & Wasserman, supra note 17; J. Ito & V. Stapleton, supra note 17; Ko-
walski & Rickicki, Determinants of Juvenile Postadjudication Dispositions, 19 J.
RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 66 (1982); Liska & Tausig, Theoretical Implications of So-
cial Class and Racial Differences in Legal Decision Making for Juveniles, 20 Soc.
Q. 197 (1979); Mann, Courtroom Observations of Extra-Legal Factors in the Juve-
nile Court Dispositions of Runaway Boys: A Field Study, 31 Juv. & FAM. CT. J. 43
(issue 4 1980); Phillips & Dinitz, Labelling and Juvenile Court Dispositions: Offi-
cial Responses to a Cohort of Violent Juveniles, 23 SOC. Q. 267 (1982); Scarpitti &
Stephenson, Juvenile Court Dispositions: Factors in the Decision-Making Pro-
cess, 17 CRIME & DELINQ. 142 (1971); Terry, The Screening of Juvenile Offenders,
58 J. CRiM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 173 (1967); Thomas & Cage, The Effect
of Social Characteristics on Juvenile Court Dispositions, 18 Soc. Q. 237 (1977);
Thornberry, Race, Socioeconomic Status and Sentencing in the Juvenile Justice
System, 64 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 90 (1973); Thornberry, Sentencing Dispar-
ities in the Juvenile Justice System, 70 J. CRim. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 164 (1979).
Only 12 studies of disposition decisions contained sufficient information to
permit calculation of the proportion of disposition variation accounted for in the
research; the rest of the studies did not report the data necessary to estimate
effect sizes. The 12 studies were: M. BORNTER, supra note 12 (Bortner used two
different data collection methods, and each is treated as its own "study-," the first
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lice records and probation records.88 Studies that examined data that
were not part of some official bureaucratic record were typically ob-
servational studies.89 Few studies have used standard social scientific
methods of controlled data collection.90
In addition to these methodological problems, there have also been
concerns about how researchers operationalized offender and offense
information. For many years, the dominant approach in juvenile jus-
tice research was first to divide the universe of juvenile information
variables into traditional legal information variables such as the na-
ture of the present offense and the number of prior offenses, and then
group all other variables such as age, gender, and maturity together as
study was based upon cases that Bortner tracked using court records and the sec-
ond study was based upon Bortner's observation of juvenile court hearings); L.
COHEN, supra (studies were conducted in three different jurisdictions, and each is
treated as its own study); Bailey & Peterson, supra; Carter, supra; Horwitz &
Wasserman, supra note 17; Kowalski & Rickicki, supra note 17; Phillips & Dinitz,
supra; Terry, supra; and Thomas & Cage, supra. The effect sizes obtained for
each of these studies are reported in Table 1.
The effect sizes for each study were cumulated in order to arrive at an average
multiple correlation coefficient (r) for the 12 studies. A. Tomkins, supra, at 54-74.
The average multiple correlation was i = .45, accounting for 20% of the variation
in the analyzed disposition decisions. Id. See also Grisso, Tomkins & Casey,
supra note 18, at 411 n.18. Although not a trivial proportion of variation for
which to be able to account, it is not a substantial proportion of disposition varia-
tion.
Finally, because of the large number of cases examined in the meta-analysis
(there were over 75,000 disposition cases that were the basis of the studies con-
ducted by the investigators of the twelve meta-analyzed studies), it is unlikely
that any unanalyzed studies, subsequently conducted studies, nor any other stud-
ies which may have been conducted but which have not been reported (ie., they
are locked in a researcher's "file drawer") would cause the multiple correlation
coefficient to change very much. To change the estimate of the effect size, there
would need to be tens of thousands of juveniles' cases studied that yielded an
effect size greater than the 20% effect size found in the present mete-analysis.
See generally R. ROSENTHAL, META-ANALYTIc PROCEDURES FOR SOCIAL RE-
SEARCH (1984); Rosenthal, Meta-Analysis: Toward a More Cumulative Social Sci-
ence, 4 APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOLOGY ANN. 65 (1983)(discussing the file-drawer issue
and presenting data relevant to the large number of studies that would have to be
available to alter inferences made from meta-analyses). There is no basis or em-
pirical evidence available to support such a belief. Thus, we can feel confident
that the 20% variation is a fair representation of the proportion of variation ac-
counted for by previous dispositional studies.
88. See studies listed supra note 87. See also Feld, Principle of Offense, supra note
11, at 879-89.
89. E.g., M. BORTNER, supra note 12 (observation of 162 disposition hearings).
90. For an exception, see W. Reay & R. Millimet, Judgmental Factors in the Disposi-
tion of the Juvenile Offender (1990)(unpublished manuscript)(using an experi-
mental design and case vignettes to examine dispositional decisionmaking).
Barton, supra note 18, and Lamiell, supra note 18, are among several critics who
have argued that the use of such standard methodologies would contribute
greatly to our understanding of juvenile justice decisionmaking issues.
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extra-legal variables.91 The legal/extra-legal distinction is arguably
valid in the criminal justice context because there the justice system is
presumably dealing with the offense, not the offender. In the juvenile
justice context, however, the distinction is of little use because juve-
nile courts are provided virtually unlimited discretion in decisionmak-
ing.92 Even after the juvenile rights movement gained momentum in
the 1960's, the juvenile justice system remained an offender-oriented
system, even as it took on more of the attributes of an offense-oriented
system. As the Court indicated in Kent v. United States,93 broad dis-
cretion is allowed in the juvenile courts because of the rehabilitative
and nonpunitive missions of that system. Because that discretion
properly relies on not only legal offense information but also nonlegal
offender characteristics, several commentators have called for system-
atic study of juvenile justice decisionmaking in order to document the
variety of offender and offense variables used in decisionmaking and
the extent to which these variables actually influence judgments.9 4
B. The Present Study
The present disposition study was part of a larger program of re-
search undertaken by a team of researchers trained in psychology and
law, headed by St. Louis University psychologist Thomas Grisso. 95 The
primary research study ("SLU Study") was an examination of the use
of psychosocial information regarding offender characteristics and le-
gally-relevant data regarding offense characteristics in juvenile justice
decisionmaking. The researchers wanted to identify the legal and
psychosocial characteristics of children used by juvenile justice profes-
sionals in their detention, transfer, and disposition decisionmaking.
As the researchers wrote, "social science methods can assist the law by
examining the range of information available for decisions, structur-
ing the diversity of information, and examining courts' current uses of
information in relation to legal decisions."96
The research was intended to improve upon past methodological
limitations, especially the characterization of the offender and offense
91. See supra note 13 & accompanying text. See also supra note 17 & accompanying
text. For a review of this literature and a critique of the distinction between legal
and extra-legal variables, see, ag., Horwitz & Wasserman, supra note 13; Horwitz
& Wasserman, supra note 17.
92. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
93. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
94. E.g., Barton, supra note 18; Horwitz & Wasserman, supra note 17; Lamiell, supra
note 18. See also 2 C. SMITH, T. BLACK & A. WEIR, A NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF
CASE DisPOsnON AND CLASSIFICATION IN THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM: INCON-
SISTENT LABELLING-RESULTS OF A LITERATURE SEARCH (1980); Bailey & Peter-
son, supra note 87; Thomas & Cage, supra note 87.
95. Grisso, Tomkins & Casey, supra note 18.
96. Id. at 404.
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variables.97 Juvenile justice professionals were asked to respond to
questions relevant to a case about which they had made a judgment.
They were asked not only about the legal information that they might
have used in making important decisions about juvenile offenders, but
also about the relevant psychosocial information that they had avail-
able to them. The initial research suggested that decisionmakers had
access to and used such information in reaching legal judgments.98
The SLU Study was primarily based upon responses to a compre-
hensive survey devised to examine the use of legal and extra-legal
(i.e., psychosocial) variables in juvenile justice decisionmaking.99 The
researchers surveyed 1,423 respondents in 127 separate courts located
in 34 different states.'00 The SLU Study respondents were juvenile
justice professionals - including, juvenile court judges, referees, com-
missioners, prosecuting attorneys, defense attorneys, probation of-
ficers, and mental health professionals.1 1 These professionals had
recently participated in making a detention, transfer, or disposition
decision about a juvenile offender. The respondents were asked to de-
scribe the juvenile's case by answering 14 questions that categorically
"described" various demographic or offense information, such as the
Juvenile's Age, Sex, Race, and Charge Information. 02 The respon-
dents were asked to use a seven-point, continuous response scale
(ranging, for example, from "Not at All" to "A Great Deal") to rate
the juvenile on 79 items, including the juvenile's motivation to change
his or her behavior; depression; the family's ability to supervise, con-
trol, and discipline the juvenile; and prior police contacts. 03
As noted, the primary purpose of the SLU Study was to identify
the domain of information used by juvenile justice professionals in
their decisionmaking. We found that the information domain covered
by the 79 continuous variables could be summarized by nine factor-
analytico 4 "metavariables."' 05 These factor variables are: 1) Motiva-
97. Id. at 409-15.
98. Id. at 412-15.
99. Id. at 415-19.
100. Id. at 417-19.
101. Id. at 419.
102. Id. at 416 & n.30.
103. Id. at 417 & n.31.
104. Factor analysis is a statistical technique used to identify large numbers of vari-
ables that can be grouped together to form factors, or meta-variables. See gener-
ally R. CATTELL, THE SCIENTIFIC USE OF FACTOR ANALYSIS IN BEHAVIORAL AND
LIFE SCIENCES (1978); H. HARMAN, MODERN FACTOR ANALYSIS (3d ed. 1976). For
less technically complex descriptions of the factor analytic technique, see S.
KACHIGAN, STATISTICAL ANALYSIS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY INTRODUCTION TO
UNIVARIATE AND MULTIVARIATE METHODS ch. 15 (1986); J. KIM & C. MUELLER,
INTRODUCTION TO FACTOR ANALYSIS (1978); B. TABACHNICK & L. FIDELL, supra
note 87, 597-677. Perhaps the most comprehendible treatment of factor analysis
for non-statisticians is Kim, Factor Analysis, in STATISTICAL PACKAGE FOR THE
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tion to Accept Intervention; 2) Reliance and Self-Autonomy; 3) Prior
Contacts with the Juvenile Justice System; 4) Absence of Serious
Mental Disorder; 5) Family Caring and Resource Capability; 6) Sus-
ceptibility to Delinquent Peer Influence; 7) Family Socialization; 8)
Behavioral Compliance in Legal Settings; and 9) Involvement in
School or Work Settings.10 6 Simple correlations between the factor
variables107 and detention, transfer, and disposition judgments re-
vealed considerable relationships between the factor variables and the
juvenile justice decisions.O8
Of fourteen categorical demographic and offense variables, seven
addressed current offense information; 09 these can be combined into
one, Seriousness of Offense variable.110 Respondents also indicated
whether it was a First Offense. Data on seven other demographic
variables were obtained: Age, Gender, Race, Enrolled in School, Liv-
ing with Family, Two Parents in Home, and Employed. Simple corre-
lations between these categorical variables and the detention, transfer,
and disposition decisions uncovered much less extensive relationships
than had been found for the factor variables.l"'
This information was based upon responses obtained for the entire
SLU Study, which covered detention, transfer, and disposition cases.
However, for the study reported in this Article, only the disposition
cases from this larger study were used. The results from this sample's
data are reported below.
1. Subjects for the Present Study
As part of the SLU Study, 470 juvenile justice professionals were
asked to complete a survey that addressed disposition decisionmaking.
SOCIAL SCIENCEs 468 (N. Nie, G. Hull, J. Jenkins, K. Steinbrenner & D. Brent
eds. 2d ed. 1975)(this publication, however, is no longer in print and may be diffi-
cult to obtain).
105. Grisso, Tomkins & Casey, supra note 18, at 419-23.
106. Id. at 422-28.
107. Factor variable scores were computed for each respondent on all nine factors. See
Kim, supra note 104. See generally sources cited in note 104.
108. Grisso, Tomkins & Casey, supra note 18, at 428-31.
109. See id. at 416 n.31 & 430. On the seven current offense variables, respondents
were asked to indicate whether the current offense was a Felony, Misdemeanor,
Status Offense, an Offense Against Persons, an Offense Against Property, a Vio-
lent Offense, and a Violation of Probation.
110. The responses to six of the seven offense variables, see supra note 109, were
turned into a Seriousness of Offense score by combining the type of offense (Fel-
ony, Misdemeanor, Status Offense) with the nature of the offense (Person Of-
fense, Property Offense, Violent Offense). The most "severe" offense score was
coded where the respondent indicated a felony (it did not matter whether the
offense was also classified as a misdemeanor or status offense) which was violent
and against person and property. The least severe offenses were Status Offenses.
111. Grisso, Tomkins & Casey, supra note 18, at 430-31.
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The juvenile justice professionals were randomly sent one of two sur-
vey forms. Two-hundred twenty-six decisionmakers were sent a sur-
vey that asked them to rate the last juvenile for which they had made
a disposition judgment in which the respondent felt that the appropri-
ate dispositional option was that the youth should remain in his or her
home or home-community ("In-Home/Community").112 Two-hun-
dred forty-four decisionmakers were sent a survey that asked them to
rate the last juvenile for which they had made a disposition judgment
in which the respondent felt that the appropriate dispositional option
was to remove the youth from his or her home or home-community
("Out-of-Home/Community").l' 3 Approximately 67% (N=317) of the
professionals returned completed surveys; 146 of the 317 of the re-
turned surveys were In-Home/Community surveys, and 171 were Out-
of-Home/Community surveys.114 The 317 professionals came from 88
different juvenile courts located in 25 states. There were 8 judges; 6
referees/commissioners; 15 prosecuting attorneys; 44 defense attor-
neys; 200 court officers including probation officers, field officers, or
supervisors; and 44 mental health professionals.115
112. The exact wording of the In-Home/Community survey directions were as follows:
Please think back to the most recent delinquency disposition case, with
which you had direct contact, in which you felt that the juvenile should
not be sent to a correctional or training facility because he/she could be
rehabilitated in the community. It does not matter whether or not the
juvenile was actually placed in such a facility as part of the imposed dis-
position, only that you personally felt that the juvenile could be rehabili-
tated in the community. This is the case that you will use to answer all
the questions in this survey.
Id. at 415-16. See also A. Tomkins, supra note 87, at 127.
113. The exact wording of the Out-of-Home/Community survey directions were as
follows:
Please think back to the most recent delinquency disposition case, with
which you had direct contact, in which you felt that the juvenile should
be sent to a correctional or training facility because he/she could not be
rehabilitated in the community. It does not matter whether or not the
juvenile was actually placed in such a facility as part of the imposed dis-
position, only that you personally felt that the juvenile could not be re-
habilitated in the community. This is the case that you will use to
answer all the questions in this survey.
Grisso, Tomkins & Casey, supra note 18, at 416-16. See also A. Tomkins, supra
note 87, at 127.
114. The return rate was comparable for the two surveys: 65% of the In-Home/Com-
munity surveys sent out were returned, and 70% of the Out-of-Home/Community
surveys sent out were returned. This return rate was similar to the overall re-
turn rate, 68%, for all surveys sent as part of the SLU Study. Grisso, Tomkins &
Casey, supra note 18, at 418.
115. The states, number of courts participating per state, and the number of juvenile
justice professionals who participated from each state were as follows: California
(15 courts, 64 respondents), Colorado (1 court, 4 respondents), Delaware (1 court,
2 respondents), Florida (4 courts, 11 respondents), Georgia (2 courts, 2 respon-
dents), Illinois (3 courts, 7 respondents), Indiana (2 courts, 5 respondents), Louisi-
ana (2 courts, 10 respondents), Maryland (5 courts, 18 respondents),
DISPOSITIONAL DECISIONMAKING
2. Measures Used in the Study
Each respondent completed a survey that contained over 100 of-
fense and offender items. For the target-juvenile about whom the re-
spondent had selected to base all survey responses, the respondent
made ratings on the categorical variables"16 and the continuous vari-
ables.117 The case instructions" 8 were the only part of the survey that
differed between the In-Home/Community and the Out-of-Home/
Community versions of the survey.n9
In order to assess the extent to which respondents' ratings of of-
fense and offender characteristics correlated with dispositional deci-
sionmaking, the following approach was used. First, respondents'
ratings of the 79 continuous variable ratings were statistically trans-
formed into factor scores for each of the nine factors, 2 0 and the factor
scores were treated as each decisionmaker's ratings on the nine factor
variables. Then, using the nine factor ratings and the respondents'
ratings on the nine categorical variables as the set of eighteen predic-
tors1 i variables, the predictor variables were regressed22 upon the In-
Home/Community versus Out-of-Home/Community disposition.
Thus, the disposition judgment was treated as the outcome or criterion
variable.-23
Massachusetts (2 courts, 10 respondents), Michigan (6 courts, 40 respondents),
Missouri (1 court, 2 respondents), New Jersey (7 courts, 24 respondents), New
Mexico (1 court, 3 respondents), New York (6 courts, 14 respondents), North Car-
olina (3 courts, 11 respondents), Ohio (6 courts, 14 respondents), Oregon (1 court,
2 respondents), Pennsylvania (7 courts, 21 respondents), Rhode Island (1 court, 19
respondents), South Carolina (1 court, 1 respondent), Tennessee (4 courts, 11 re-
spondents), Texas (2 courts, 4 respondents), Virginia (2 courts, 7 respondents),
and Wisconsin (3 courts, 11 respondents).
116. See supra text at note 102.
117. See supra text at note 103.
118. See supra notes 112 & 113.
119. For more details, see Grisso, Tomkins & Casey, supra note 18, at 415-17. See also
A. Tomkins, supra note 87, at 126-27.
120. See supra note 104. Factor scores were computed using the complete estimation
method. See Kim, supra note 104, at 488-89.
121. See supra note 20.
122. See generally J. COHEN & P. COHEN, APPLIED MULTIPLE REGRESSION/CORRELA-
TION ANALYSIS FOR THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCEs (1975); G. KEPPEL & S. ZEDECx,
DATA ANALYSIS FOR REsEARcH DESIGNS: ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE AND MuLTIPLE
REGRESSION/CORRELATION APPROACHES (1989); F. KERLINGER & E. PEDHAZUR,
MULTIPLE REGRESSION IN BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH (1973); E. PEDHAZUR, MuLTi-
PLE REGRESSION IN BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH: EXPLANATION AND PREDICTION (2d
ed. 1982).
123. See supra note 20.
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3. Results
a. Descriptive Analyses
The disposition sample mean ratings and standard deviations for
all 19 variables (the eighteen predictor variables and the one outcome
variable), as well as the variable intercorrelations, are reported in Ta-
ble 2. The mean Age of the juveniles who were rated was 15 1/2 years
of age, with a standard deviation of 1.2 years. The Sex of the rated
juvenile in the vast majority of the cases was male (86%).12A The Race
of over half of the rated juveniles (56%) was white; 44% of the
juveniles were non-white.12 5 The vast majority of the juveniles (86%)
were living with their family.126 There were Two Parents in the
Home of slightly less than half the juveniles rated (48%).=2' 7 Most
juveniles were Enrolled in School (73%),128 and most were not Em-
ployed at least half-time (86%).129 Only 26% of the juveniles were fac-
ing their First Delinquency Charge. 3 0 Finally, the Seriousness of the
Charged OffenseiSl for most of the rated juveniles was fairly serious.
Felony offenses were involved in 71% of the 287 cases in which the
respondent provided offense ratings. 32 Twenty-six percent of the 287
cases were misdemeanors and 3% were for status offenses.
124. Standard deviations will not be reported in the text for dichotomous variables,
although they may be obtained from Table 2. Dichotomous variables were coded
using "1" and "2"; thus, all means are between 1.00 and 2.00. For the "Sex" varia-
ble, female was coded as 1, male as 2.
125. See supra note 124. The Race variable was not broken down further than White
versus Non-White for purposes of this study. White was coded as 1, Non-White
was coded as 2.
126. See supra note 124. If the juvenile was living with his/her family, it was coded as
1; if not, the code was 2.
127. See supra note 124. If there were two parents in the home, the code was 1; if not,
the code was 2.
128. See supra note 124. If the juvenile was enrolled in school, the code was 1; if not,
the code was 2.
129. See supra note 124. If the juvenile was employed half-time or more, the code was
1; if not, the code was 2.
130. See supra note 124. If the juvenile was facing his/her first delinquency charge,
the code was 1; if not, the code was 2.
131. The coding scale for seriousness of offense ranged from 11 to 39, with 11 being the
most serious allegations (a felony, or felonies, that were violent, against a person
or against property). See supra note 110.
132. Twenty-nine percent (n=83) of the 287 cases for which offense data were avail-
able involved violent felonies and/or felonious crimes against a person. These 83
cases constituted 40% of all felony cases. However, it is likely that both the 29%
and the 40% proportions underestimate the extent of violent or person felonies.
In 44 (out of the 205) of the identified felony cases, the respondent failed to indi-
cate the nature of the offense. Thus, of the 161 offenses in which there was some
indication of whether the offense was against persons or against property and of
whether it was a violent offense, more than half of them involved a violent felony
or a felony against a person.
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b. Bivariate Correlations3 3
The 18 bivariate correlations between the factor and description,
predictor variables and the disposition, criterion variable may be
found by reading across row 19 of Table 2. These data show that 14 out
of the 18 offense and offender variables were significantlyl corre-
lated with the dispositional judgment.
The rate of correlation ("r") for five of the variables with disposi-
tion was at a level greater than or equal to .30, which is a very large
correlation coefficient by social scientific standards. The five variables
were Motivation to Accept Intervention (r = -. 54), Behavioral Com-
pliance in Legal Settings (r = -. 44), Prior Contacts with the Juvenile
Justice System (r = -. 41), Involvement in School or Work Settings (r
- -. 38), and Family Caring and Resource Capability (r = -. 30).135
Only four variables did not display significant, bivariate correla-
tions. These were Employed (r = .01), Sex (r = .04), Two Parents in
the Home (r = .08), and Race (r = .08). These correlations indicate
that there is virtually no rate of correspondence between these four
variables and disposition.
The variable intercorrelations may be found to the left of the diag-
onal on the data matrix in Table 2. The intercorrelations reveal ex-
tensive relationships among the variables indicating that there is a
great deal of shared variance among them. For example, judgments
about a juvenile's Motivation to Accept Intervention, the variable
most highly correlated with the disposition variable, were highly cor-
related with judgments about 12 of the 17 other predictor variables.
Similar patterns are found throughout the data set.
Where there is such a high intercorrelation rate among predictor
variables, one predicts that the numbers of significant correlations be-
tween the disposition outcome variable and the offense and offender
predictor variables will decrease if the extent of intercorrelation is sta-
tistically controlled, leaving only the unique correlation between each
offense or offender variable and the disposition variable that is not
otherwise accounted for by the shared correlations.13is Multiple re-
gression analyses provide this information.
133. Bivariate correlations are sometimes referred to as simple correlations or zero-
order correlations. See infnz note 137.
134. "Significance" is a statistical term, indicating that the relationship between vari-
ables is not a chance or random relationship but is a systematic one, at least ac-
cording to probability distributions. See, eg., J. MONAHAN & L. WALKRa, supra
note 20, at 75-81.
135. Negative correlations indicate that there was an inverse relationship between
high ratings on these factors and the likelihood that the juvenile would be
deemed to need an Out-of-Home/Community placement.
136. See infra note 137.
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c. The Multiple Repression Analysis
The 18 offense and offender predictor variables were regressed on
the disposition variable. A simultaneous, multiple regression was
used.137 The results of the analysis are reported in Table 3.
The multiple regression analysis yielded a multiple correlation co-
efficient of .68. This means that the offense and offender ratings were
highly correlated with the disposition decision. These data accounted
for nearly 46% of the variance associated with disposition judgments
made by the 317 survey respondents.138
As expected, controlling for the effects of the other variables
markedly reduced the number of predictor variables which correlated
significantly with the disposition variable. Variables for which con-
trolled correlations were not significant, but which had been signifi-
cantly correlated with disposition when the bivariate correlations
were run were Behavioral Compliance in Legal Settings (r = -. 44,
= -. 09), Involvement in School or Work Settings (r = -. 38, 1 =
-. 04), Family Caring and Resource Capability (r = -. 30, 1 = -. 03),
137. The multiple regression procedure provides the overall correlation coefficient be-
tween the disposition outcome variable and the 18 offense/offender variables. In
addition, the procedure identifies the unique correlation between the disposition
variable and each predictor variable. The simple, or bivariate, correlation does
not control for the extent to which one predictor variable shares variance with
another predictor variable. For example, the Motivation to Accept Intervention
variable was highly correlated with most of the other predictor variables. See
supra text at note 136. The unique correlation between the disposition, outcome
variable, and the Motivation variable and every other predictor variable is com-
puted as part of the multiple regression procedure. See Table 3 (the unique corre-
lation is represented by the symbol 0). Extensive discussions about the multiple
regression statistic are contained in sources cited supra note 122.
138. The proportion of variance (R), which is calculated by squaring the multiple cor-
relation coefficient (R), reveals the extent of the total variation, see supra note 20,
in the dispositional decisionmaking data that is able to be accounted for by the
offense and offender data obtained in this study. To put the 46% proportion of
variance obtained in this study into a broader perspective, it is useful to realize
that social scientists consider 10% of the variance accounted for (R > .3; R2 = .1)
to be a meaningful proportion of variance to be able to explain. Thus, the extent
of variation accounted for in this study indicates that a much greater proportion
of variance has been explained in the study of dispositional decisionmaking than
social scientists usually are able to explain in complex behavioral contexts such as
discretionary decisionmaking. Moreover, the meta-analysis of the twelve disposi-
tion studies, see supra note 87, yielded an average effect size of .20, half the rate
accounted for in the present study. This difference is statistically significant. See
A. Tomkins, supra note 87, at 139-40. See also id. at 140-60 (examining whether
the difference in effect sizes between the meta-analyzed studies and the present
study could have been a function of the number of variables examined).
Even when an adjustment is made to the multiple correlation coefficient to
take into account the large number of predictors included in the regression equa-
tion (the Adjusted R 2), the proportion of variation still remains at a sizeable
42.5%. See Table 3. The F test of the regression model confirmed that the model
significantly accounted for disposition judgments (p < .001). See Table 3.
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Susceptible to Delinquent Peer Influence (r = -. 26, 0 = -. 06), En-
rolled in School (r = -. 25, = -. 06), Family Socialization (r = -. 23,
1 = -. 10), Age (r - .21, 1 - .10), Self-Reliance and Autonomy (r =
.20, 1 = .08), First Delinquency Charge (r = .19, 1 = -. 02), and Seri-
ousness of Charged Offense (r = -. 12, 1 = -. 04).
Only four correlations remained significant. The variable which
correlated most highly with disposition was Motivation to Accept In-
tervention (1 = -. 37). The correlation indicated that there was an
increased likelihood that the decision would be made to keep the juve-
nile In-Home/Community associated with higher ratings on the Moti-
vation variable.
The next highest correlation was with the variable Prior Contacts
with the Juvenile Justice System (0 = -. 18). The higher the rating
on this variable (indicating fewer prior contacts), the less likely it was
that the juvenile would be placed Out-of-Home/Community. The cor-
relations for the other two significant variables - Living with Family
and Absence of Serious Mental Disorder - were approximately L .10.
A juvenile who did not live in the home of his or her parents was more
likely to be recommended for an Out-of-Home/Community place-
ment, as would a juvenile who displayed signs of a mental disorder.
Where there is a substantial correlation among variables, there is
the likelihood that the contribution of certain variables to the ex-
plained disposition variation was suppressed by the simultaneous mul-
tiple regression procedure.13 9 This is because the simultaneous
regression reveals only the unique proportion of variation accounted
for by each variable on the dispositions. A forward multiple regres-
sion analysis4o was conducted to determine which of the offense and
offender predictor variables contributed significantly to the explained
disposition variation. The results of this analysis are presented in Ta-
ble 4.
The results of the forward multiple regression revealed that there
are six variables - Motivation to Accept Intervention, Prior Contacts
with the Juvenile Justice System, Living with Family, Family Sociali-
139. See generally J. COHEN & P. COHEN, supra note 122, at 87-91.
140. See F. KERLINGER & E. PEDHAUZER, supra note 122, at 285-89. In the forward
multiple regression analysis, the predictor variable which is most highly corre-
lated with the outcome variable is identified mathematically and then entered
into the regression model as the first variable. Next, the variable which accounts
for the greatest proportion of the remaining outcome variable variance, (i.e., the
proportion of variance accounted for by the first predictor variable has already
been removed) is entered into the regression model as the second variable. Sub-
sequent variables are entered into the model after controlling for the amount of
variance already accounted for by previously extracted predictor variables. Typi-
cally, additional variables are entered into the model if they reach the .05 level of
significance for the increase in the explained proportion of variance that still re-
mains left to be explained.
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zation, Age, and Absence of Serious Mental Disorder - that signifi-
cantly increased the proportion of disposition variation that can be
accounted for by offense and offender data. Of the proportion of vari-
ation accounted for by the entire 18 variable data set (R2 = .46; see
Table 3), virtually all of it (96%) can be accounted for by the six
variables.
IV. THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL AND A DISCUSSION OF
THE DISPOSITIONAL DECISIONMAKING STUDY
At the heart of the juvenile justice disposition system is the con-
cept of rehabilitation.14i Judge Ketcham has argued that the juvenile
justice system's focus on rehabilitation of the juvenile offender is the
quid pro quo for the absence of procedural and substantive due pro-
cess safeguards in the juvenile justice system. Juveniles exchange the
full panoply of constitutional protections provided adults in return for
141. The idea of crime and punishment was to be abandoned. '"Te child was to be
'treated' and 'rehabilitated' and the procedures, from apprehension through insti-
tutionalization, were to be 'clinical' rather than punitive." In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1,
15-16 (1967). E.g., Zimring, Background Paper, in Report of the Twentieth Cen-
tury Fund Task Force on Sentencing Policy Toward Young Offenders, CON.
FRONTING YouTu CRIME 27 (1978); Comment, Rehabilitation as the Justification
of a Separate Juvenile Justice System, 64 CALIF. L. REv. 984 (1976).
Rehabilitation may be the goal, but there is some concern over whether it is a
realistic one. For example, the National Academy of Sciences Task Force on the
Rehabilitation of Criminal Offenders concluded that there is not sufficient evi-
dence to support the proposition that juveniles are especially amenable to treat-
ment. THE REHABmrATION OF CRIMINAL OFFENDERS: PROBLEMS AND
PROSPECTS 50-51 (L. Sechrest, S. White & E. Brown eds. 1979). See generally Mel-
ton, supra note 11, at 159-66 (review of literature on whether juveniles are ame-
nable to treatment).
It is unsurprising, therefore to find that in some jurisdictions, there is a pur-
poseful shift away from a rehabilitation model towards a punitive model. See,
e.g., Fink, Juvenile Delinquency Legislation: Punishment in Vogue, in LEGAL
ADVOCACY FOR YOUTH 263 (H. Davidson & R. Horowtiz eds. 1986); Dawson, The
Third Justice System: The New Juvenile-Criminal System of Determinate Sen-
tencing for the Youthful Violent Offender in Texas, 19 ST. MARY'S L.J. 943
(1988); Note, Rehabilitation vs. Punishment A Comparative Analysis of the Ju-
venile Justice Systems in Massachusetts and New York, 21 SUFFOLK U.L. REV.
1091 (1987). See also Feld, Principle of Offense, supra note 11, at 851-79; Gardner,
Punitive Juvenile Justice: Some Observations on a Recent Trend, 10 INTL J.L. &
PSYCHIATRY 129 (1987)[hereinafter Gardner, Punitive Juvenile Justice]; Kris-
berg, Schwartz, Litsky & Austin, The Watershed of Juvenile Justice Reform, 32
CRIME & DELINQ. 5 (1986); McCarthy, Delinquency Dispositions Under the Juve-
nile Justice Standards: The Consequences of a Change of Rationale, 52 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1093 (1977). Interestingly, Gardner proposes, using some of the same argu-
ments as have the rehabilitation advocates, that there may be advantages to some
youths to claim a "right" to punishment rather than a right to rehabilitation.
Gardner, The Right of Juvenile Offenders to be Punished. Some implications of
Treating Kids as Persons, 68 NEB. L. REv. 182 (1989)[hereinafter Gardner, The
Right to be Punished].
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the promise of treatment. Ketcham referred to this as the "mutual.
compact" between the juvenile offender and the juvenile justice sys-
tem. 42 In light of this promise for treatment, some have maintained
that it permissible to institutionalize a juvenile, or, in fact, impose any
lesser disposition only if the purpose of the intervention is to rehabili-
tate the youngster.143
Although there is evidence to support the proposition that juvenile
courts are dispensing with the pretense of rehabilitation and imposing
punishments qua punishments on juvenile offenders,144 it is unlikely
that the dispositional goal of rehabilitation will be completely dis-
placed so long as there remains an independent juvenile justice sys-
142. Ketcham, supra note 25.
143. See, eg., Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 1974), cert denied, 417 U.S. 976
(1974)(right to rehabilitative disposition); In re Aline D., 14 Cal. 3d 557, 536 P.2d
65, 121 Cal. Rptr. 816 (1975)(holding that institutionalization is impermissible un-
less there are rehabilitative purposes). Judge Ketcham, supra note 25, advocated
dismissal of juvenile court jurisdiction if a juvenile could not be offered adequate
rehabilitative services. See also Wizner & Keller, supra note 11.
Other commentators point out that the concept of rehabilitation implies effec-
tive treatment. The quid pro quo of the mutual compact theory - that is the
exchange of due process protections for treatment - has been deemed to be an
unwise legal fiction, particularly insofar as the concept of treatment implies effec-
tive treatment. E.g., F. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL: PE-
NAL POLICY AND SOCIAL PURPOSE (1981); PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND ADMNITRATION OF JuSTICE, TASK FORCE REPOnn CORREC-
TIONS (1967); E. SCHUR, RADICAL NON-INTERVErTON, supra note 12; Feld, supra
note 11; Gardner, Punishment and Juvenile Justice: A Conceptual Framework
for Assessing Constitutional Rights of Youthful Offenders, 35 VAND. L. REv. 791
(1982).
In the absence of effective treatment possibilities, aternative models have
been proposed. These include proportional punishment approaches such as found
in just deserts. See, ag., McCarthy, supra note 141. They also include determi-
nate sentencing statutes. See, eg., Dawson, supra note 141. Furthermore, they
include an emphasis on the best interests of the community instead of the best
interests of the juvenile. See, e-g., In re Quinton A., 49 N.Y.2d 328,402 N.E.2d 126,
425 N.Y.S.2d 778 (1980); Santana v. Collazo, 714 F.2d 1172 (1st Cir. 1983); State in
Interest of TLR, 513 So.2d 554 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1987). See generally Rubin, supra
note 63.
The idea of a court looking at the community's interest rather than the delin-
quent's interest is not new;, courts have been doing this for many years. E.g., State
v. Meyers, 74 N.D. 297,22 N.W.2d 199 (1946). One commentator has recently gone
so far as to argue that it would be more humane to promote a juvenile's constitu-
tional right under the eighth amendment to be punished rather than to continue
to pursue ineffective treatments primarily because the right to punishment
would also entitle a juvenile offender to a variety of substantive and procedural
protections. Gardner, The Right to be Punished, supra note 141. See also Shep-
herd, supra note 11.
144. See supra notes 141 & 143. See especially Dawson, supra note 141; Feld, Legisla-
tive Reform, supra note 11; Feld, Principle of Offense, supra note 11; Gardner,
supra note 143; Gardner, Punitive Juvenile Justice, supra note 141; Gardner, The
Right to be Punished, supra note 141.
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tem.145 Thus, it was not surprising to find the Supreme Court, in
Schall v. Martin, continuing to implicitly acknowledge the rehabilita-
tive purposes of the juvenile justice system even as it legitimized the
pretrial punishment of juvenile offenders.146 So long as the remnants
of the rehabilitative ideal remain, disposition decisions should be a
function of both offense and offender characteristics.
According to the rehabilitative ideal, offender information should
be used, along with offense information, since the "services" the court
provides to the juvenile should be tailored to the juvenile's individual
needs in light of the offense committed. The dispositional decision-
making study reported in this Article indicates that offense and of-
fender data are used by juvenile justice professionals, and these data
are used in a manner consistent with what would be expected if the
rehabilitative ideal continues to influence decisionmaking.
The multiple regression analysis of the disposition data indicated
that offense and offender information, together, greatly influence dis-
positional judgments (R2 = .46; see Table 3). Offense and offender
variables also individually influence disposition judgments. Four vari-
ables were found to be significantly related to the disposition decision
145. Several cases have held that there is a right to treatment for institutionalized
juveniles. E.g., Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 1974), cert denied, 417 U.S.
976 (1974); Inmates of Boys' Training School v. Affleck, 346 F. Supp. 1354 (D.R.I.
1972); Pena v. New York State Division for Youth, 419 F. Supp. 203 (S.D.N.Y.
1976); Morgan v. Sproat, 423 F. Supp. 1130 (S.D. Miss. 1977). In order to prevent
such "deep penetration" into the correctional side of the juvenile justice system,
several commentators argue that in-home or community-based dispositions are
preferable to out-of-home or out-of-community placements. E.g., NATIONAL AD-
VISORY COMMITTEE FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, STAN-
DARDS 297 (1980); I. ScHwARTz, supra note 35. Although these commentators
recognize exceptions to the in-home preference should include situations in
which the juvenile has committed a violent offense or is a chronic offender, or a
serious risk of future harm exists if the juvenile is not removed from the home or
community, such situations are relatively rare in comparison to the numbers of
juveniles who come into contact with the juvenile justice system. For most
juveniles, the policy ought to be to keep the juvenile in his or her home. INSTI-
TUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION/AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, JUVENILE JUS-
TICE STANDARDS PROJECT, STANDARDS RELATING TO DISPOSITIONS 34 (1980).
146. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 272-73 (1984):
Pretrial detention need not be considered punitive merely because a ju-
venile is subsequently discharged subject to conditions or put on proba-
tion. In fact, such actions reinforce the original finding that close
supervision of the juvenile is required. Lenient but supervised disposi-
tion is in keeping with the [New York statute authorizing preventive de-
tention] purpose to promote the welfare and development of the child.
See also People ex rel. Wayburn v. Schupf, 39 N.Y.2d 682, 690, 350 N.E.2d 906, 910
(1976) ("It should surprise no one that caution and concern for both the juvenile
and society may indicate the more conservative decision to detain at the very out-
set, whereas the later development of very much more relevant information may




when the influence of all the other variables was controlled (see Table
3). The Motivation to Accept Intervention variable was most highly
correlated with disposition, followed by Prior Contacts with the Juve-
nile Justice System. The other two variables were the Living with
Family and the Absence of Serious Mental Disorders. Thus, the prior
record variable, an offense-related variable, joined three offender vari-
ables in correlating significantly with disposition decisions.
The results of the forward multiple regression analysis mostly re-
peated the result pattern from the other regression analysis. The Mo-
tivation and Prior Contacts variables again were most highly
correlated with disposition, followed by the Living with Family varia-
ble. Variables not previously found to be correlated, Family Socializa-
tion and Age, next entered the model. Absence of Serious Mental
Disorders was the last variable significantly correlated with disposi-
tion. The results of the forward regression, therefore, point to the sig-
nificant role that offender variables play in making disposition
decisions. It also confirms the importance of the legal variable Prior
Contacts, but as in the previous analysis, no present offense variable
was found to significantly contribute to the disposition decisions.
Together, the results of the statistical analyses provide support for
the notion that both offense and offender data contribute to disposi-
tion decisionmaking. 147 Although the only legal or offense variable
found to significantly correlate with disposition was Prior Contacts,
this may have been an artifact of the distribution of Seriousness of
Offense data. The vast majority of the offenders were charged with
felonies, and there was evidence in the data to indicate that these felo-
nies were serious ones. Without sufficient variation, it is possible that
the statistical influence of this variable was underestimated.148 The
lack of variation should not be surprising. If the juvenile justice sys-
tem is working as both an offense-sensitive and an offender-sensitive
system, it is reasonable to assume that without a threshold serious of-
fense there would little reason to consider Out-of-Home/Community
dispositional alternatives. Furthermore, since the most extreme seri-
ous offenses result in transfer to the criminal system anyway, there
147. A similar result was obtained by Reay and Millimet in their research. They
found that juvenile justice decisionmakers
are very likely to recommend placement outside the home if the juvenile
offender is seen to be living in a dysfunctional home, is judged to be suf-
fering from a mental disorder, and ... had prior contact with the juvenile
court system. On the other hand, if the juvenile is living in a fully-func-
tioning home, is not historically or presently showing signs of mental
disorder, and... is a first-time offender, it is very likely that it will be
recommended or decided that he remain in the family home.
W. Reay & R. Millimet, supra note 90, at 16.
148. See supra note 132 and accompanying text. See generally J. COHEN & P. COHEN,
supra note 122, at 64-66 (discussing the issue of underestimated correlations when
a variable's value range is restricted).
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would likely be a narrow bandwidth of offenses that give rise to post-
adjudication, disposition decisionmaking.
V. IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY FOR PRACTICE, POLICY,
AND FUTURE RESEARCH
Both the general SLU Study and the specific, dispositional study
reported here support the hope that social science can provide data
useful for understanding juvenile justice decisionmaking in such a
way that interventions can be fashioned that would result in decision-
making changes. Several commentators have held out the hope that
such studies can be used to positively influence the way that decisions
are actually made in the system.149 Change strategies can be targeted
at the individual decisionmaker level or at the systems level.
A. Strategies to Influence Change at the Individual Decisionmaker Level
Once empirical research has "captured" the contribution of offense
and offender information to dispositional decisionmaking, it may be
possible to control how much weight is placed upon specific variables.
For example, Hammond and his colleagues,S0 as well as other deci-
sion researchers,15l have shown that individuals' judgments can be
149. E.g., Barton, supra note 18; Lamiell, supra note 18. See also Grisso, Tomkins &
Casey, supra note 18.
150. See, e.g., Hammond, Toward Increasing Competence of Thought in Public Policy
Formation, in JUDGMENT AND DECISION IN PUBLIC POLICY FORMATION: AMERI-
CAN ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE SELECTED SYMPOSIUM 11
(1978); Hammond & Adelman, Science, Values, and Human Judgment, 194 SdL
389 (1976); Hammond & Grasia, The Cognitive Side of Conflict" From Theory to
Resolution of Policy Disputes, 6 APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOLOGY ANN. 233 (1985);
Hammond, Rohrbaugh, Mumpower & Adelman, Social Judgment Theory: Appli-
cations in Policy Formation, in HUMAN JUDGMENT AND DECISION PROCESSES IN
APPLIED SETniNGs 1 (M. Kaplan & S. Schwartz eds. 1977). See generally Ham-
mond, Stewart, Brehmer & Steinmann, Social Judgment Theory, in HUMAN
JUDGMENT AND DECISION PROCESSES 271 (M. Kaplan & S. Schwartz eds. 1975).
151. E.g., Arkes, Faust, Guilmette & Hart, Eliminating the Hindsight Bias, 73 J. AP-
PLIED PSYCHOLOGY 305 (1988); Fischhoff, Debiasing, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCER-
TAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 422 (D. Kahneman, P. Slovic & A. Tversky eds.
1982). For general overviews of the human judgment and decisionmaking litera-
tures, see B. ANDERSON, D. DEANE, K. HAMMOND, G. MCCLELLAND & J.
SHANTEAU, CONCEPTS IN JUDGMENT AND DECISION RESEARCH (1981); B.
FIsCHaoFF, L. LICHTENSTEIN, P. SLOVIC, S. DERBY & R. KEENEY, ACCEPTABLE
RISK (1981); K. HAMMOND, G. MCCLELLAND & J. MUMPOWER, HUMAN JUDGMENT
AND DECISION MAKING: THEORIES, METHODS, AND PROCEDURES (1980); JUDG-
MENT AND DECISION MAKING: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY READER (H. Arkes & K.
Hammond eds. 1986); R. NISBEiT & L. Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES
AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT (1980); D. VON WINTERFELDT & W. ED-
WARDS, DECISION ANALYSIS AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH (1986); J. YATES, JUDG-
MEN'r AND DECISION MAKING (1990); Einhorn & Hogarth, Behavioral Decision
Theory: Processes of Judgment and Choice, 32 ANN. REV. PSYCHOLOGY 53 (1981);
Pitz & Sachs, Judgment and Decision: Theory and Application, 35 ANN. REv.
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changed by getting them to attend to specific decision factors.152 The
implication for juvenile justice decisionmaking is there is a likelihood
that decisionmakers could be "educated" as to the implications of their
attending to certain types of offense or offender information. For ex-
ample, although it was not a subject of investigation in the research
reported here, it may be that when decisionmakers are trying to de-
cide whether to recommend placement outside the home, they place
too much weight on motivation information and not enough on family
information. Future research that correlates juvenile justice decision-
making information with future juvenile behavioral outcomes could
lead to improved prediction as to which juveniles "cannot be rehabili-
tated in their home or community."L5 3
In particular, empirical studies could be especially important in fa-
cilitating better use of secure institutionalization alternatives. The
wisdom of institutionalizing juveniles in secure facilities, where the
child experiences great deprivation of liberty, is being questioned.54
Despite overarching philosophical differences, policymakers and deci-
sionmakers representing virtually the whole array of rehabilitation
versus punishment perspectives agree that society has only a limited
ability to incarcerate the numbers of juveniles adjudicated delinquent
for committing serious offenses.155 Both those who espouse a more
just deserts approach to juvenile crime and those who continue to call
for more benevolent treatment for youthful offenders come together
in the belief that the juvenile justice system cannot institutionalize
great numbers of children.156 Regardless of whether they arrive at
their position on philosophical grounds (e.g., kids should not be placed
into institutions), on economic grounds (e.g., institutionalization re-
PSYCHOLOGY 139 (1984). See also Judgment and Decision Processes, 7 BEHAv. Sci.
& L. 429 (D. Faust ed. 1989)(special issue).
152. See Arkes, Principles in Judgment/Decision Making Research Pertinent to Legal
Proceedings, 7 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 429, 449-51 (1989)(recent review of the literature
on improving faulty decision processes with relevance to legal decisionmaking).
153. See Grisso, Tomldns & Casey, supra note 18, at 432 (suggesting that future studies
should assess the relationships between decisionmakers' judgments - which
often serve as predictors of juvenile behavior - and subsequent behaviors en-
gaged in by juveniles); Grisso & Conlin, supra note 63, at 189 (studies of juvenile
justice decisionmaking would be well served to utilize the recent "sophisticated
advances in decision making theory and method")(citations omitted). See also
Lamiell, supra note 18. See generally sources cited in notes 150 & 151.
154. E.g., Barton & Butts, Viable Options: Intensive Supervision Programs for Juve-
nile Delinquents, 36 CRIME & DELINQ. 238 (1990).
155. See generally Schwartz, Steketee & Butts, Business as UsuaL" Juvenile Justice
During the 1980s, - NOTRE DAME J. L., ETHICS, & PUB. POL'Y - (1990)
(forthcoming).
156. See I. SCHWARTZ, supra note 35. See also B. KRISBERG, J. AUSTIN & P. STEELE,
UNLOCKING JUVENILE CORRECTIONS: EVALUATING THE MAssACHUSETr DIVISION
OF YOUTH SERVICES (1989)(Massachusetts follows a policy of incarcertaing only
those juveniles who pose a serious risk of future harm).
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quires too much in the way of financial resources, both in light of the
physical structure expenses and in light of the care costs), or on practi-
cal grounds (e.g., there are not enough beds to accommodate all the
juveniles that get into non-minor legal trouble), there is a growing
consensus to the effect that institutionalization is expensive and that
there is a shortage of appropriate facilities and caretakers.15 7 More-
over, the more restrictive institutionalization settings are particularly
expensive. Thus, most agree that such settings should be used only for
the most hardcore, the most severe, the most dangerous, and the most
dysfunctional youths.'- 8
Considered in this manner, institutionalization can be viewed as a
scarce resource, and therefore a resource that should be used only
when necessary. Unnecessary placements into institutions are not
only inappropriate, they are costly,159 unnecessary governmental ex-
penditures.160 Moreover, an inappropriate placement can have the ef-
fect of preventing a juvenile who needs services best provided outside
of an institutionalized context from having access to the resources to
which that juvenile is entitled and needs.
A debate currently exists concerning the precise nature of the ju-
venile who needs institutionalization. Although there is agreement
that a juvenile who is dangerous or who is a serious "career criminal"
should be institutionalized,161 there is less consensus as to which indi-
viduals are these type of offenders. Are all juveniles who commit a
heinous act per se dangerous? Are those youths who have been ar-
157. I.SCHWARTz, supra note 35; Schwartz, Steketee & Butts, supra note 155.
158. See, e.g., In re Groves, 93 N.C. App. 34,376 S.E.2d 481 (1989). The Court in Groves
held "that it was error to commit [the juvenile delinquent] to training school
without first examining the appropriateness of community-based dispositional al-
ternatives." Id. at 41, 376 S.E.2d at 485. The State's Juvenile Code and its disposi-
tional options reflect a legislative preference for in home/community
dispositions. Although the interest of the state and the safety of the public are
appropriately considered, the out-of-home/community option is to be used only in
"extraordinary" circumstances. Id. at 37-38.
Professor Schwartz would have legislatures go even further. He recommends
the closing of all state training schools and suggests that, in their place, there
should be developed "small, high-security treatment units reserved for youth
who commit serious violent crimes and for chronic offenders." These treatment
units should house a maximum of 20 youths at a time. I. SCHwARTZ, supra note
35, at 169-70.
159. See, e.g., Barton & Butts, supra note 154. See also Gendreau & Ross, Revivica-
tion of Rehabilitation"L Evidence from the 1980s, 4 JuST. Q. 349 (1987); Green-
wood, Promising Approaches for the Rehabilitation or Prevention of Chronic
Juvenile Offenders, in INTERVENTION STRATEGIES FOR CHRONIC JUVENIE OF-
FENDERS 207 (P. Greenwood ed. 1986).
160. See, e.g., Barton & Butts, supra note 154 (in-home placement, intensive supervi-
sion program was as effective - or ineffective - as institutionalization and was
approximately one-third the cost).




rested more than, say, five times within a two year period properly
labeled career criminals? What is the number of arrests or adjudica-
tions that serves as the threshold for the label of career criminal?
Does it make a difference if a child has been adjudicated delinquent on
charges of vandalism as opposed to armed robbery?
Both policy debate and juvenile justice decisionmaking could be
improved if social scientists were able to distinguish which children
would continue to be dangerous in the future and which children
would commit crimes as part of a lifelong career of violence and
wrongdoing from those which act-out in a time-limited, adolescent
fashion. If this information were available, decisions could be struc-
tured to ensure accurate dispositions; only those who needed out-of-
home placements would receive them. Even those youngsters who did
need to be removed from their homes should not be placed in the
deeper-end, secure facilities unless it could be demonstrated that there
were sufficient resources available to treat the institutionalized of-
fender.16 2 Unfortunately, the clinical literature does not provide
much useful information beyond common sense; we have little basis to
assess whether children are being appropriately placed into secure fa-
cilities.163 Indeed, the best estimate would be to assume that more
children are locked-up than need to be.
Despite the lack of firm clinical data, 64 the approach taken in con-
ducting the research reported here could help address these issues. It
has demonstrated the utility of studying decisionmakers' decisionmak-
ing and judgment strategies rather than concentrating solely upon the
offenders' characteristics. Decisionmakers' perceptions as to which
youths deserve or are in need of institutionalized care are as important
in determining who will receive an out-of-home placement as are the
"realities" of the youth. If we can systematically identify the charac-
teristics of kids who are perceived by juvenile justice decisionmakers
to be in need of secure, out-of-home placements, then we can address
whether the information to which they attend is allowing them to
make the kinds of discriminations in judgment that are required in
scarce resource systems. Although such research has not yet been
conducted, there seems to be great benefits to doing so in the future.
Another avenue of exploration concerns the extent to which of-
162. See cases cited at note 145 (if a juvenile is institutionalized, the juvenile has a
right to receive treatment in the institution).
163. See generally G. MELTON, J. PErRLA, N. POYTHRESS & C. SLOBOGIN, supra note
43, at 300-07.
164. See, eg., Mulvey, Judging Amenability to Treatment in Juvenile Offenders: The-
ory and Practice, in CHLDREN, MENTAL HEALTH, AND LAw 195 (N. Reppucci, L.
Weithorn, E. Mulvey & J. Monahan eds. 1984). See generally E. MULVEY, M. AR-
THUR & N. REPPUCCI, REVIEW OF PROGRAMS FOR THE PREVENTION AND TREAT-
MENT OF DELiNQUENCY (1990)(background paper for Adolescent Health Project,
Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress).
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fense and offender information interact with each other. For exam-
ple, the Motivation variable was shown, by itself, to account for a
considerable proportion of disposition variation (29.5%; see Table 4) in
the study. Although the Motivation factor appears to be solely an of-
fender characteristic, it is possible that it communicates offense-re-
lated information to the decisionmaker. It may be that a display of
motivation to change, a sense of guilt or remorse, respect for authority
and authority institutions such as the courts, and a willingness to ac-
cede to adult intervention - all major components of the Motivation
to Accept Intervention construct 16 5 - will provide a framework
through which a juvenile justice decisionmaker will "see" the juve-
nile's offense. Some criminologists' 66 have hypothesized that the
amalgam of offense and offender information will coalesce in a court-
worker's initial impression formation of the juvenile offender and
prompt the decisionmaker to make an assessment of the "moral char-
acter"167 of the juvenile. The moral character "frame" operates in a
manner similar to a light filter; information that is compatible is let in,
but incompatible information is shielded out. Consequently, initial
impressions often lead to pervasive judgments about the extent to
which the juvenile-in-question has entered into the world of crime.168
Psychologists recognize the crucial importance of cognitive
frameworks for the perception and processing of information.169 It is
reasonable to expect that viewing subsequent information in light of
an assessment of the juvenile's motivation will lead a decisionmaker to
perceive the juvenile in a different "light" than if the juvenile's of-
fense or family situation was assessed first. This is why the legislature
can be so influential in shaping juvenile justice decisionmaking. For
165. See Grisso, Tomkins & Casey, supra note 18, at 422-25.
166. E.g., M. BORTNER, supra note 12; R. EMERSON, supra note 12.
167. R. EMERSON, supra note 12.
168. See, e.g., Terry, supra note 87.
169. See, eg., Fischhoff, Hindsight Foresight The Effect of Outcome Knowledge on
Judgment Under Uncertainty, 1 J. EXPER. PSYCHOLOGY: HUMAN PERCEPTION &
PERFORMANCE 288 (1975); Kahnemann & Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames,
39 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 341 (1984); Nisbett, Krantz, Jepson & Kunda, The Use of
Statistical Heuristics in Everyday Inductive Reasoning, 90 PSYCHOLOGICAL REV.
339 (1983); Saks & Kidd, Human Information Processing and Adjudication.
Trial by Heuristics, 15 LAw & Soc'y REV. 123 (1980); Slovic, Fischhoff & Lichten-
stein, Response Mode, Framing, and Information-Processing Effects in Risk As-
sessment, in NEW DIRECrIONS FOR METHODOLOGY OF SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL
SCIENCE: QUESTION FRAMING AND RESPONSE CONSISTENCY 21 (R. Hogarth ed.
1982); Tversky & Kahnemann, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Bi-
ases, 185 SCI. 1124 (1974); Tversky & Kahnemann, The Framing of Decisions and
the Rationality of Choice, 211 ScI. 453 (1981). See generally COGNITION AND So-
CiAL BEHAVIOR (J. Carroll & J. Payne eds. 1976); COGNITIVE PROCESSES IN
CHOICE AND DECISION BEHAVIOR (T. Wallsten ed. 1980); JUDGMENT UNDER UN-




example, if the legislature draws a decisionmaker's attention to family
information7O by calling for a family-focus in juvenile justice consid-
erations, it may influence the decisionmaker's consideration of the
other information that is received.171
B. Strategies to Influence Change at the Systems Level
Field research conducted as part of the SLU Study,172 as well as
that conducted by others, 7 3 suggests that there is a tendency toward
homogeneity of decisionmaking within courts. Most decisionmakers
within a particular court tend to have a very similar outlook about the
types of children that are causing problems, as well as the types of
remedies that are likely to work with them. Although there are cer-
tainly differences within courts, there seems to be less within-court
variation than there seems to be inter-court variation. How do courts,
as institutions, get so many of their professionals to see juvenile justice
issues in such a similar manner?
The most likely explanation is institutional socialization.174 Deci-
sionmakers, particularly non-judges without ultimate dispositional au-
thority, learn what the "expected" decisions are for certain juveniles.
A learning process occurs with most organizationally "successful" pro-
fessionals learning to identify which children will receive which dispo-
sitions. Such a socialization process is a plausible explanation for the
high correspondence rates that have been found by researchers be-
tween probation officers' dispositional recommendations and judges'
ultimate decisions.175
Future empirical research efforts could uncover the types of pres-
sures that could be applied to influence juvenile court systems to
170. See, eg., G. MAELTON, J. PETrsLA, N. PoYTBmEss & C. SLOBOGIN, supra note 43, at
304-05.
171. See infra notes 177-82 and accompanying text.
172. Grisso, Tomkins & Casey, supra note 18, at 412-13.
173. E.g., M. BORTNER, supra note 12; R. EMERSON, supra note 12.
174. See, e.g., Glick, The Judicial 'Firm": A Useful Model for Understanding Decision-
Making in a Juvenile Court, 63 JUDICATURE 328 (1980). See also Hassenfeld &
Cheung, The Juvenile Court as a People-Processing Organizatiomn A Political
Economy Perspective, 90 AM. J. SOcIOLOGY 801 (1985); Mohr, Organizations, De-
cisions, and Courts, 10 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 621 (1976); D. Wolfe, An Organizational
Approach to Court Structure: A Case in Point with Juvenile Court Decisionmak-
ing (1989)(unpublished masters thesis, Law/Psychology Program, University of
Nebraska-Lincoln).
175. E.g., M. BORTNER, supra note 12 (95% correspondence); Ariessohn, supra note 87
(80% correspondence). A plausible alternative hypothesis for the large corre-
spondence is that judges rely on probation officers because defense counsel abdi-
cates its responsibility for providing alternatives to the probation officer's
recommendations. See Roche, Juvenile Court Dispositional Alternatives: Impos-
ing a Duty on the Defense, 27 SANTA CLARA L. Rsv. 279 (1987). The result is that




change their decisionmaking tendencies. Given that decisionmakers
do appear to "learn" the rules of decisionmaking and recognize which
values are most important within their courts, it would seem possible
to intervene for the purposes of having a smaller proportion of
juveniles placed outside the home or community by establishing in-
centives for decisionmakers to learn new rules, by focusing them on
certain factors,176 by steering them away from certain other factors,
and by implementing reward structures for promoting a different out-
come distribution of the numbers of juveniles who are removed from
their families or communities.
One possible approach to such a systems level intervention is
through the use of legislation. In Nebraska,177 as well as in other ju-
risdictions,?s new, broad policies have been enacted explicitly calling
for the use of in-home/community options over options that result in
removal.1 7 9 The advantage of comprehensive policies such as Ne-
braska's Family Policy Act of 1987180 is that they have the potential of
fashioning a change in social views and expectations. If the juvenile
justice and the child/family social service systems were to adopt a phi-
losophy of non-removal except in the most extreme circumstances
(and then put that philosophy into practice), juvenile justice deci-
sionmakers, as would all child/family service decisionmakers, would
likely begin to focus on those aspects of the offender that would most
efficiently assist them in making the socially-preferred choice. The
type of wholesale, social change that I am suggesting might occur in
the future did in fact take place during the development of the juve-
nile justice system at the turn of the century. The juvenile justice phi-
losophy was not only a reflection of the "progressive" times, 8 1 it also
helped to alter social norms about treating juvenile offenders. 8 2
Thus, changes in laws can synergize broad social reforms and have
considerable impact on individual decisionmaking.
176. See supra text accompanying notes 169-71.
177. Family Policy Act of 1987, NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 43-532 - 45-534 (1990).
178. E.g., South Carolina, S.C. Code § 20-7-20 (1989).
179. Nebraska's law, for example, not only applies to all juveniles who "have violated
the laws" but also applies to any child or family who requires "assistance from a
department, agency, institution, committee, or commission of state government"
"[E]very reasonable effort" must be made to keep the juvenile in his or home or
"as close to the home community .. . as possible." NEB. REV. STAT. § 45-
532(2)(1990).
180. See supra note 177.
181. See, e.g., R. MAENNEL, supra note 2; A. PLATr, supra note 1; S. SCHIOSSmAN, supra
note 1. See generally LEVINE & LEVINE, supra note 10.
182. For a similar argument about the reciprocal relationship between socio-cultural
changes and legal changes, see Tomkins, Psychology and the Constitution, 21 PSY-
CHOLOGY TODAY 48 (Sept. 1986). See generally Melton, The Clashing of Symbols
Prelude to Child and Family Policy, 42 AM. PsYCHOLoGIsT 345 (1987); Melton,
The Significance of Law in the Everyday Lives of Children and Families, 22 GA.
L. REV. 851 (1988).
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System-level intervention and individual-level interventions are
not mutually exclusive, however. The goals underlying the recent en-
actment of public policies that call for restricting out-of-home place-
ment to a few specific juvenile delinquents will be furthered if social
scientists can aid juvenile justice professionals in focusing on the in-
formation that will allow these decisionmakers to make the disposi-
tional discriminations required to meet policy goals. This assistance is
especially valuable in the period immediately after laws are changed
when it is necessary for decisionmakers to change their judgment
practices.
VI. CONCLUSION
The data reported from the empirical study of dispositional deci-
sionmaking indicate that both offender information and offense infor-
mation are being appropriately used in making disposition decisions.
The study demonstrates the potential utility of using empirical meth-
ods to address policy and legal issues in the juvenile justice system.
Juvenile justice research does not need to rely solely on archival,
bureaucratic data, nor does it need to focus only on the juvenile. Both
the juveniles and the decisionmakers are important data sources. Re-
gardless of whether the advocates of punishment or the advocates of
rehabilitation prevail in the short term, and regardless of whether the
two perspectives continue to co-exist in reality, empirical studies can
help to shed light on the information being used by juvenile justice
professionals in their decisionmaking activities.
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VII. APPENDIX
TABLE 1
EFFECT SIZES, SAMPLE SIZES, AND NUMBER OF
PREDICTOR VARIABLES INVESTIGATED
FOR THE META-ANALYZED,
DISPOSISTION STUDIES (N = 12)
Effect No. of
Study SizeA N Predictor Variables
Bailey & Peterson, supra note 87 .38 54,679 9
Bortner, supra note 12
Formally processed cases .45 2,551 9
Observed cases .57 162 14
Carter, supra note 87 .6,P 190, 8
Cohen, supra note 87
Denver County .71 5,684 11
Shelby County .77 6,596 11
Montgomery County .50 1,302 10
Horwitz & Wasserman, supra note
17 .51 464 7
Kowalski & Rickicki, supra note 87 .63 133 6
Phillips & Dinitz, supra note 87 .55 d  3,316 8
Terry, supra note 87 .11, 246 12
Thomas & Cage, supra note 87 .15' 1,522 9
'Effect sizes listed are the reported, unadjusted multiple correlation coefficient, or its
equivalent, unless otherwise indicated.
b Carter investigated both the probation officer's recommendation and the judge's
decision. The correlation reported was the average of the canonical correlations (from
the discriminate analyses) for the two groups (.640 and .642, respectively).
c This is a conservative (high) estimate of the number of non-status offender cases for
which there was official treatment. Carter did not provide the exact figure; he did
indicate that the total number of non-status offenders was 199. The sample size used
here presumes a minimum number (ie., 9) of these juveniles were unofficially handled.
In fact, fewer juvenile cases probably were included in the discriminant analysis of non-
status, officially-handled cases.
d Phillips & Dinitz used discriminate analysis in their study. An effect size was
computed by taking the square root of the proportion of the explained variance
accounted for by the relation between the independent variables and the discriminate
functions. See L. MARASCUILO & LEviN, MULTIVARIATE STATISTICS IN THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES: A RESEARCHERS GUIDE 320-22 (1983).
'Terry reported 12 bivariate correlations (tau). The average correlation was
computed, and it is this value which is reported.
f Thomas and Cage reported nine bivariate correlations (Cramer's V). The average















MULTIPLE REGRESSION FOR OFFENSE/OFFENDER
CHARACTERISTICS AND DISPOSITION
DECISIONS (N = 317)
Predictor Variables r R
Factor Variables
Motivation to Accept Intervention -. 543*** -. 189 -. 366**
Self-Reliance and Autonomy .202*** .044 .080
Prior Contacts with Juvenile Justice System -. 408*** -. 096 -. 178**
Absence of Serious Mental Disorder -. 215*** -. 056 -. 094*
Family Caring and Resource Capability -. 302*** -. 018 -. 032
Susceptibility to Delinquent Peer Influence -. 256*** -. 032 -. 058
Family Socialization -. 226*** -. 054 -. 098
Behavioral Compliance in Legal Settings -. 437*** -. 052 -. 089
Involvement in School or Work Settings -. 381"** -. 019 -. 037
Description Variables
Age .208*** .040 .095
Sex .043 .003 .002
Race .083 -. 016 -. 016
Living with Family .144** .154 .101*
Two Parents in Home .083 .024 .021
Enrolled in School .245*** .067 .059
Employed .014 -. 015 -. 010
First Delinquency Charge .192*** -. 023 -. 020
Seriousness of Charged Offense -. 124* -. 004 -. 044
Constant .199
Summary Table
Multiple R .6766 df SS MS F
R2  .4578 Regression 18 36.06 2.00 13.97**
Adjusted R .4250 Residual 298 42.70 .14
Standard Error .3785









Step Variable R R 2  AR2
1. Motivation to Accept Intervention .543 .295 .295***
2. Prior Contacts with Juvenile Justice System .611 .373 .078***
3. Living with Family .628 .394 .021***
4. Family Socialization .641 .411 .017**
5. Age .652 .426 .015**
6. Absence of Serious Mental Disorder .660 .440 .009*
Note." Criterion for inclusion was p < .05 for A R.
*P < .05; **p < .01; ***P < .001.
